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PROF. H. SILAS STUART.
On Saturday, June 17th, about the hour
of noon, occurred the death of H. Silas
Stuart, Esq. Prof. Stuart was taken ill
on Wednesday, his sickness developing
later into pneumonia.
Prof. Stuart belonged to all influential
and prominent family in this vicinity. He
was born in South -Kiddleton Township,
Cumberland county, in 1854. After adequately preparing lie entered Princeton
College, from which lie graduated with
lhonor in 1878.

He then went abroad and

continued his studies at the Universities of
Heidelburg and Edinburg. After a course
of several years abroad he returned to this
county and began the study of law. le
was admitted to practice in 1882. Heearly
obtained high professional standing and a
lucrative practice.
His acknowledged ability and high
scholarship were recognized when he was
called to a professorship in the Dickinson
School of Law. In this capacity he gave
entire satisfaction. His death will be
deeply regretted by all who had the priv-.
ilege of listening to his eloquent lectures.
The students deeply mourning his sudden
demise will remember him as a man--sincere, courteous and learned.
RESOLUTIONS OF FACULTY.

At a meeting of the Faculty, June 19th,
1899, on the report of Hon. J. M. Weakley

CARLISLE,

PA.

and Hon. W. F. Sadler, a committee appointed to draw up a memorial upon tile
death of H. Silas Stuart, Esq., the following paper was unanimously adopted:
As an expression of our profound sorrow
at the death of our late associate HUGIi
SILAS STUART, Esq., and of our appreciation of his ability, attainments and character. the Faculty of the Dickinson School
of Law, resolve;
1. That the death of _Mr. Stuart has deprived the Dickinson School of Lav of one
of its most able Instructors, whose ripe
scholarship, thorough professional training
and exceptional capacity asa teachergave
great prestige to the school ; ana whoseintegrity, sincerity of character and gentleness of disposition exerted a marked influence for good on all who had the fortune
to be under his care.
2. That by his death the profession has
lost ee of its ablest members and the Bar
of Cumberland County has been deprived
of the influence and example of a well
trained lawyer, a ripe scholar and a gentleman whose ionor and integrity were un-

questioned, and whose courtesy, kindness
and generosity, alike to all, were observable
in every act of his professional life.
3. That we recall with pride and pleastire the successful professional career of
our late associate; his energy, business activity, his many enterprises, contributing
largely to the advancement of the coin-
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munity; his ever active benevolence, -his
abounding charity for every one.
4. That we tender to the bereaved family of our late associate our heartfelt sympathy in their hour of sorrow and invoke
for them the support of that Divine Power
to whom are known all the sorrows of the
children of men and whose abounding
mercies are the sure refuge of all our race.
5. That a copy of these resolutions be
presented to the family of our late associate
and that they be furnished for publication
to the newspapers of the county.

beamed down his burning rays in such
a manner as to transform one's brow with
channels for carrying running streams
of perspiration and to make the vendor of
fans, ice cream soda, etc., smile with satisfaction, and to cause our heated humanity
to sigh for the Klondike, or some of last
winter's snows.
The exercises of the week began with
the baccalaureate sermon by Dr. Reed, on
Sunday morning. Before the services,
the classes, law and college, together with
the faculties of the two institutions assembled on the lawn before the president's
house, where the college class with their
This will be the last-issue of the FORUm,
under the present editorial staff and board black gowns, and the law class, with their
of managers. This year has been one of purple colored robes presented an imposunusual success. The components of the ing and dignified spectacle. At a given
different boards, have worked harmo- time, these bodies moved in procession,
niously and well, and each has used his into the Allison M. E. church where the
best endeavors to make the paper a suc- services were held, and where Dr. Reed
cess. We have issued one more number delivered one of his characteristic, strong,
this year, than in former years, and have and emphatic sermons.
The Commencement exercises proper of
increased our number of subscribers, so
that to the present managers has been the law school were held in Bosler Hall
granted their full measure of success. We on Tuesday evening. The hall was well
thank all of our patrons and subscribers filled, and the exercises were very interestfor their kind courtesies, and trust that ing. The class reassembled on the lawn,
they will continue their patronage with early in the evening and marched in proour very worthy successors in the editorial cession with the faculty, trustees and inand managing departments. The paper corporators, through the campus and up
is an excellent instrument for keeping to Bosler Hall. Here seats had been rethe alumni in touch with their Alma served for the class, and the faculty, trusM-ater, and we hope the list of subscribers tees, and incorporators took places on the
platform. After music by the orchestra,
will be enlarged by a generous addition
B. Frank Sellers, as class representative,
of their names.
delivered an excellent oration. The oration is printed elsewhere in this issue.
MEETING OF INCORPOR&TORS.
After a second selection had been rendered
by the orchestra, the baccalaureate oration
Nothing unusual was done at the meet- was delivered by that distinguished editor
ing of the Incorporators of the school. The and journalist, Hon. St. Clair McKelway,
official reports were presented, and the editor of the Brooklyn Eagle, and one of
place of W. P. Orbison, deceased, was sup. the foremost men in the country to-day.
plied by the election of Frank C. Bosler, Mr. McKelway's address, the subject
of
Esq., of Carlisle, member of the class of which being "American Leadership,"
was
'96.
a strong, powerful and masterly one. The
speaker is a prince of orators, as w .l as of
The Commencement of.ninety-nine was composers.
After this address, degrees were conferred
one of the most interesting and attractive
which have been held at old Dickin- upon the class, which numbers thirtyson. Much might be said concerning all nine and is the largest ever graduated, and
of the exercises of the week, but space for- prizes were awarded. The exercises closed
bids and we must confine ourselves to a brief with a selection by the orchestra.
mention of the most important events.
That the Dickinson Law School is growThe weather was of the best. Old Sol ing in prominence and influence, that it
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is destined to become one of the greatest
legal institutions in the country, and that
it to-day offers the best opportunities for
securing a legal education which can anywhere be found, cannot be denied.
The following is a list of the graduates:
George W. Coles, of Wiconisco; Arthur
M. Devall, of Wharton; Samuel B. Hare,
of Altoona; William A. Jordan, of Bedford; Frederick C. Miller, of Harrisburg;
Samuel H. Miller, of Wiconisco; J. Franklin Rehm, of Alliance, Ohio; George W.
Aubrey, of Catasauqua; J. Kirk Bosler, of
Carlisle; William M. Flanigan, of Altoona;
Walter B. Freed, of Boyertown; Wencel
Hartman, Jr., of Philadelphia; Walter J.
Henry, of Altoona; Lewellyn Hildreth, of
Rio Grande, N. J.; E. H. Hoffman of
Williamstown; Harry C. Hubler, of Elysburg; A. Frank John, of Mount Carmel;
Merkel Landis, of Carlisle; Frank J. Laubenstein, of Ashland; D. Edward Long, of
Fayetteville; Thomas M. McCachran, of
Newville; B. Johnston MacEwen, of Kane;
Charles McMeans, of Scranton; John G.
Miller, of Pine Grove Mills; Charles G.
Moyer, of Stouchsburg; Frederick D.
Oyler, of Shamburg; Julia A. Radle, of
Georgetown; Daniel R. Reese, of Plymouth; Isaiah Scheeline, of Altoona; Geo.
L. Schuyler, of Milton; Frank B. Sellers,
Jr., of Carlisle; Charles A. Shambaugh,
of Bloserville; Eugene D. Siegrist, of Lebanon; Robert H. Smith, of Oakville; Garrett B. Stevens, of Reading; Robert P.
Stewart, of Harrisburg; Herman M. Sypherd, of Wilmington, Del.; Ruby R. Vale,
of Carlisle; Charles R. Weeks, of Port
Washington, N. Y., and Marlin Wolf, df
Shamokin.
There is to be a redistribution of studies
next year, with a view to the avoidance
of the concentration of the instruction of
any year upon few preceptors.

Mfusic ...................... ........

ORCHESTRA.

"The Bay State,"

COMMITTEE.
MERKEL LANDIS,
J. KINK BOSLER,

MARLIN WOLF,
Wm. A. JORDAN,
CHAS. G. MOYER,

HARRY C. HUBLER,
HERMAN

M.

SYPHERD.

USHERS.
OLIVER G. LENTZ,
' HARRY P. CONLEY,
DANIEL F. DEAL,

ARTHUR W. MITCHELL,
LORRIE R. HOLCOMB,
WM. H. JOHNSTON',

WILSON S. ROTHERMEL.

One of the most pleasant features of this
year's graduation, was the evidence given
by the dean, of his friendship and regard
for the members of the class, in the gift
to each member of a copy of Lawrence on
the Principles of International Law. This
generous act on the part of Dr. Trickett
but seems to tighten the bonds of friendship
which the fellows feel for him, and to
give another cause for pleasant reminiscences of him and his instruction.
The following men were admitted to
practice in the several courts of Cumberland County on Thursday, June 8th. We
congratulate them upon their successful
termination of their courses, and trust
they will meet with their full share of
worldly success.
Coles, Miller, F. C., Miller, S. H., Vale,
Long, Sellers, Hare, Jordan, Landis, Devall, Bosler and Rehm.
The graduating clsss of '99 presented
to Dr. Trickett two very fine steel engravings, one the portrait of. former Chipf
Justice Jay, and the other, the portrait of
former Chief Justice Marshall. This gift
was made as a token of the esteem and
friendship with which each member of the
class regards the honored Dean of our institution.

We note the presence of the following of
the alumni at Commencement. We were
Overture. ................... I......................... The Venus,"
glad to welcome so many of the old
COLLEGE ORCHESTRA.
"grads" back to the source of their legal
Address,."The Relation of theLawyerto the State,"
instruction and hope they will all repeat
FRANK B. SELLERS,Jr., Carlisle.
their visits during each of the succeeding
Jfusic ..........................
. . ....... "Jolly Fellows,"
years.
ORCHESTRA.
BaccalaureateAddress .............................................
Kiser, Rochow, Zug, Stamey, Savidge,
HON. ST. CLAIR MCKELWAY, LL. D.
Caldwell, Murr, Goodall, Le Goullon, AlJMusic .......................................... "Merry Gleaners,"
lison, Brightbill, Miss Maas, Sam Boyer,
ORCHESTRA.
Irving, Irwin, Marker , Mickey, Omwake,
ConferringofDegrees.
Reiff and Shapley.
Awarding of Prizes.
COMMENCEMENT PROGRAM.
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TRESCOTT-WILBUR WEDDING.
.Spruceville, June 7.-Rush Barton Trescott, Assistant District Attorney of Luzerne county, and Miss Elizabeth May
Wilbur, were married this evening at the
home of the bride's parents, in this place.
PRIZES AWARDED.
The William C. Allison prize has been
awarded to Win. A. Jordan, of Bedford,
of the Senior class, for the best thesis on
Landlord's Remedies for the Recovery of
Possession of the Leased Premises. This
prize consists of a copy of Pepper and
Lewis' Digest of Statutes and Richards'
Forms.
The Edward Thompson Company prize
awarded by Judge Swope, of Gettysburg,
to B. Johnston MacEwen, of the middle
class for best essay on the Action of Ejectment in Pennsylvania. This prize consists of a set-of the Encyclopaedia ofPleading and Practice.
The Dean's prize for best Brief, awarded
to Robert P. Stewart, of Harrisburg. This
prize consists of Pepper and Lewis' Digest of Statutes, and Brewster's Common
Pleas Praitice.
The Dean's prize for best examination
in Real Property has been divided, onehalf consisting of Richards' Form Book,
being awarded to William Stewart Clark,
of Warren, and the other half, consisting
of Brewster's Common Pleas Practice to
W. Alfred Valentine of Chester County,
Pa.

MEETING OF THE DICKINSON SOCIETY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW.
The Dickinson Society of the Dickinson
School of Law held its last regular meeting for the present term May 26th, and
elected the following officers for the next
school year:
President-Howard L. Henderson.
Vice-President-Charles A. Shreve.
Secretary-Harry J. Katz.
Treasurer-William B. Gery.
Sergeant-at-Arms-J. B. Lavens.
Sheriff-Jacob P. Rueffer.
District Attorney-Harry J. Shellenberger.
Clerk of Court-Win. T. Stauffer.

Constable7-Wm. Henry Kern.
Prothonotary-Charles C. Sloan.
Register-W. Ernest Shaffer.
Warden-Daniel F. Deal.
The election was one of the most hotly
contested ever held in the history of the
society, which is noted for the intense
rivalry exhibited by its members to fill
the various offices; the organization being
such an excellent one that the members
justly consider it a proud distinction to be
assigned to the performance of any official
function. The men elected fully represent the majprity of the society and it can
feel thoroughly secure with its destinies
entrusted to their hands.
Presiolent Henderson subsequently appointed the following executive committee
to serve during his term of office: Win. T.
Stauffer, Chairman; Miss Sara M. Marvel,
Daniel F. Deal.
THESES.
The graduating theses for the year 1899,
were as follows:
Unconstitutional Acts and the Power of
the Judiciary to declare them so, Sellers.
Checks, Flanigan.
The Sunday Law of 1794, Siegrist.
Contracts of Insane Persons, Hartman.
Former Jeopardy as a Defence, Hubler.
Competency of Witnesses in Civil Actionsin Pennsylvania, Reese.
The Rule of Proximate Cause in Negligence, Freed.
Proximate Cause, Rehm.
The Liability of Stockholders in Corporations, Laubenstein.
Liability of Corporations for Torts of
their Agents, Aubrey.
History and Influence of Dartmouth
College Case, Sypherd.
A Plea for a Statute on Rule in Shelly's
Case, Bosler.
Competency of Witnesses in Criminal
Prosecutions, Schuyler.
Attachments under the Act of 1869,
Henry.
An Inquiry into the Elements of Damages for Mental Suffering,. Landis.
Embezzlement in Pennsylvania, Stevens.
Trustees in Pennsylvania, Vale,
The Plea of Payment, Scheeline.
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Law of Defalcation, Miller, J. G.
Legal and Equitable Defences to Negotiable Instruments, Oiler.
Character Evidence in Pennsylvania,
John.
Widows' Exemption in Pennsylvania,
McCachran.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet, Stewart.
Sheriff's Sales, Hoffman.
Auction and Auctioneer, Long.
Goods that may be sold under ft. fa.,
McMeans.
Causes of Divorce in Pennsylvania,
Wolf.
Implied Warranty of Title, Moyer.
Contracts in Restraint of Trade, Shambaugh.
Proof of Hand-writing, Weeks.
Jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace, in
Contracts in Pennsylvania, Jordan.
Rights and Duties of Hotel-keepers,
MacEwen.
Ultra Vires and Effect of Ultra Vire
Contracts, Coles.
Real Estate of a Partnership, Miller, S.
H.
Privileged Communications Between Attorneys and Clients, Miss Radle.
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP.
ADDRESS BY ST. CLAIR McKELWAY, LL.
D., L. H. D., A. Al., BEFORE DICKINSON LA.V SCHOOL, CARLISLE, PA.,
JUNE 6, 1899.
Some men are born great, some men
achieve greatness and other men have
greatness thrust upon them. Just as truly
some men are born leaders, some men
achieve leadership and other men have
leadership thrust upon them. A born
leader either dominates other men by the
power of his personal qualities or by his
mastery of the needs or principles which
concern a people, or by the exercise of both
gifts. Washington governed men by the
strength of his own faculties and was, at
the same time, an authority on war and
statesmanship. This double endowment
made him a leader of leaders from the
time when Braddock's broken forces asked
him to save them from deatli to the time
when, in his old age, the nation which he

had ruled for eight years asked him again
to lead the army of the republic against, if
need be, the ally which had helped it to its
freedom. There are other examples of
born leaders, but none that compares with
that of Washington in our history. No
man need doubt that had the lot of the
father of his country been cast on sea instead of on land, or in surgery instead of
in war and government or in any other
great department of human endeavor than
those in which he was called to act, he
would have gone from eminence to preeminence as truly as he did in every branch
of service to the people by which he wrote
his name above that of any other name
in the annals of the human race. Among
those not born leaders but who have
achieved leadership any number of names
could be mentioned. The second President of the United States and the fifth
President, his son, can be named in passing. Both were men of large, but not
superlative powers. Both had received a
fair but not extraordinary education,
whether in schools or in life. Both addressed themselves conscientiously and
industriously to public duties. Both were
promoted from humble functions to high
ones, and from high to the highest. Each,
however, was opposed as well as followed.
Each was antagonized by quite as many
as those who supported him. Each
achieved leadership, but long, hard and
steady labor preceded and produced that
leadership in lieu of the born primacy
which made George Washington the well
nigh undisputed leader of leaders for all
his life. Upon other men leadership has,
so to speak, been thrust. Jefferson has
been charged with thrusting it on both
Madison and Monroe. Andrew Jackson
avowed his purpose to thrust it on Martin
Van Buren, and accomplished that purpose. The number of machine made governors and senators in our time is not
small. Upon them leadership has been
thrust with the consent of parties, but not
with the result of deceiving the people.
Between the natural power of the born
leader and the self wrought power of him
who achieves leadership the distinction
may not always be plain to the masses,
but can never be entirely obscured to the
thoughtful mind.
Between the self
wrought power of an achieved leadership
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and the derivative power of those on whom
the selective judgment of machines may
have thrust leadership the distinction can
be made by almost anybody.
I have no doubt that theology, medicine, law, journalism and education supply the same human instances of the three
different kinds of leadership which the
study of politics will yield. The general
judgment makes few mistakes and the appraisals of history from complete data are
apt to ratify contemporary estimates. In
any one denomination there will be preeminent orators or pre-eminent scholars.
In literature there will be stars of the first
magnitude. And in the sky of thought,
as in the sky of nature, one star differeth
from another star in glory. The foremost
healers and surgeons of every century will
be household names in the profession
(probably the greatest of the professions) to
which they belong. The jurists and advocates who tower far above the conventional level of the law are well known in
every land and in every age. Nor should
any one need to name the teachers and
administrators who have made, in the
field of education, an impression upon
manners and upon characters that will
outlast the time when the monuments
in their honor shall have crumbled to
aborginal dust, or been succeeded by the
tides of life and of literature which may
remake and which may redate the place
of the race of man in the world.
The theme would be too large and the
invasion of your time too long should one
undertake to discuss even America's small
share in the world's leadership in any
single department of national life or of
professional activity. A French epicure
described our country as one that had two
hundred religions and not a single gravy.
We can, however, admit that, -manifold as
our state and local divisions of rule are,
we do have a single national government.
That government is the one thing to which
all Americans stand in the common character of equal citizenship. It is the one
thing the histoty of which will stand for
the history of the American people as a
whole. It is the one thing which, in the
service rendered in it or in the service rendered for it or to it, makes the computation or the comparison, the characterization or the contrast of American leaders

and of American leadership possible. I
have already told off to you my divisions
of leadership into born, achieved and
thrust. I shall not classify the leaders of
whom I would talk to you under these
heads in what I shall say. I shall leave
that classification to your own minds. Let
the fact that they were leaders, however
classifiable, suffice for you and for me in
what I shall say.
WHAT LEADERSHIP

IS.

Primarily let us agree on definitions.
The American leader is a representative
man. Rarely, however, is the representative American an American representative. We call the latter a congressman.
We are not often addicted to look to Congress with pride. We feel concerning our
congressmen much as the Missouri orator,
Svho, of course, was an Irishman, said he
felt when, as chairm:.n of a, local committee, he welcomed the chief magistrate
then on the retired list to the town of Hannibal: "Rest assured, Mr. President," he
remarked, "that you left office with the
unanimous approbation of the American
people." That was true, but the guest of
honor was not gratified to be informed of
the fact and the courteous chairman did
not exactly mean what he said. Artemus
Ward, however, put the same truth in a
more inductive way. In one of his lectures
he observed: "And now, ladies and gentlemen, let us look for a moment at Congress." But at this point his voice took
on a pathos which showed that he was
not only a humorist, but a patriot, and
not only a patriot, but a philosopher and
a man of sensibility. For he added: "No,
ladies and gentlemen, with your kind permission I would rather not look at Congress."
I have no desire to be cynical and none
to be unjust, but I do not think that any
audience would like to hold the mirror up
to Congress and to call the reflection themselves. Yet we cannot deny that we elect
our congressmen and that we elect them
to represent us; nor could we dispute that
when they do not stand up for our local
interests against the national interests we
think they serve us ill. Nor could we forbear to confess that when they get something for us, to which, in consideration of
the general rights, we might not be en-
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titled, we think they serve us well. Our
infirmities are their infirmities : our wants
are their wants. The people of whom
they are afraid are ourselves. Those whom
they seek to favor and those for whom
they do questionable things to secure reelecl ion are the constituencies that would
be offended if painted into their likeness.
A representative, however, is a typical
American. A typical American is one
who stands for what the people wish they
were; who stands for what they hope to
be regarded.
Washington bequeathed
and popularized Washingtonian qualities.
Wallace and Bruce made Scotland braver
and Burns made Scotland kinder than it
was before their time. Since Wellington,
Great Britain has shown as well as praised
his qualities. A representative man is one
who halds in solution and in exercise some
of the best qualities of the people in such a
wayas to raise them to his level. So does
the moon lift the tides. So does the magnet attract the metal particles. The particles, however, fall off. The tides recede.
But unlike the particles and unlike the
tides, a nation holds part, at least, of the
upward ground gained by it in the development of a great life. Now that we have
agreed on definitions, and now that we
have voluntarily restricted ourselves, for
reasons which I hope, commend themselves to your minds, to a consideration of
political leadership, or of leadership related to public opinion and to government
action in America, let us at once place a
wall between ourselves and the remote
past, and consider the leadership of the
last forty years. The earlier leaders have
gone to a settled account. Their place in
estimate is fixed. Your thought about
them is made up. The men of the times
in which some of us have lived will be
best for appraisal and instruction and, of
course, only a few of them can be considered. With many of them you are
familiar. Their pictures panel your walls.
Their speeches are found in your school
books. Their names have been coined
into proverbs. Their deeds have been
written on the historic page or on the
battlefield or on the quarter deck.

PICTURE OF A PAST POWER.
Leaving them for the men whom some
of us have known, take a walk with me

through the gallery of memory. Here i4
a portrait that might have been painted
by one of the masters of the modish ages.
It is looking out on a nation with the
wearied eyes of seventy years. The gaze
is one of pity, fright and helplessness. I
know that the opinion of the people on
James Buchanan has been set. I know
that the disposition is to regard him as a
senile mass of trembling jelly. But I cannot forget that he was the foremost
statesman of his party at the time of his
election to the presidency. The country
knew by what he had done just what he
would do in every then conceivable condition of affairs. He had been a Unionist of
the school of Jackson. He had opposed
states' rights as argued by Calhoun and
shrieked by Randolph. He had been a
tactician of the school of Van Buren and
and a compromiser of the school of Webster and Clay when compromise was the
essence of our constitution and the condition of our Union. He had brought Mformonism to its knees by making it feel the
grip of authority about its neck. I know
that he is condemned for not using force
to put down secession. But I remember
what you may forget. That force was the
very thing which he asked congress repeatedly for leave to use, and which congress did repeatedly refuse. At the same
time, coercion, as it is now called, was precisely that which the people of the North
forebade. Four-fifths of the press discouraged it.
Nine-tenths of the pulpits
preached and prayed against it. Ninetynine hundredths of the counting rooms denounced it. The whole Republican party
opposed to this man discountenanced coercion on the ground that the civil war,
which appeared imminent, could be prevented by statesmanship and that with
statesmanship that party would prevent
it. To the peace congress which was called
the North sent optimists and invertebrates;
and the South a picked corps of political
policy players. The first offered abject
propositions. The second marked time to
gain time by affecting to consider them.
At Washington, as the announced premier
of the incoming administration, was William H. Seward watching every move of
the retiring regime with the closeness of
an able agent of a jealous tenant soon to
come into possession. War was what Mr.
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Buchanan was urged to avert and what he
was accused of having a motive in precip
itating. When we remember his enforced
inactivity, we should rememiber ours as
the cause of it. At least once he tried to
break the cords which threatened the
Union's life. The steamer Star of the West
was secretly loaded with arms and cargoes with food for the cooped up Union
garrison in Fort Sumter. It left the New
York navy yard under sealed orders,which,
when opened, gave instructions to the
commander to relieve and reinforce Major
Anderson. At Washington the secret was
ill kept. A telegram from that city to the
confederate authorities at Charleston told
the time, route and purpose and the destination of the vessel, which was beaten off.
Who sent that telegram? James E. Harvey, the Washington correspondent of
Horace Greeley's Tribune. He sent it at
the instigation of William H. Seward, who
sincerely believed that the accomplishment of the object for which the steamer
was sent would precipitate hostilities
which the wisdom of the incoming government could prevent. What was done to
Harvey? He was made minister to Portuugal to get him out of the way. A year
later he would- have been hanged for his
fatal officiousness. All that James Buchanan was allowed to do he did. He maintained things as they were. He preserved
the occupation of the government at the
capital. He welcomed his successor with
suitable courtesy. He saw his inauguration in the constitutional way, at the customary place and with enough show of
force to combine protection with spectacle.
The things he did not do are recalled to his
reproach. The things which prevented
him from doing them are not recalled.
Abraham Lincoln did more justice to
Buchanan's patriotism than the impulsive
of his countrymen afterward did to the
motives of either of them.
MAN AND THE HOUR MEET.

Here ended a long lesson of accommodation politics in America. For decades
thereafter on things essential, principle
displaced expediency. The lesson was
slowly learned, but the teacher who taught
the people believed in them, and was in
turn himself taught by them. Gradually,

not quickly-deliberately, not impulsively,
the people rose to the measure of their
duty. Their first purpose was union.
Their second was nationality. Their third
and best was freedom. As said, the man
for the hour was found I shall never forget my first sight of him. The time was
a leaden February morning in Philadelphia. The place was in front of Independence Hall. Chestnut street and the contiguous cross streets were dense with
people. The city had risen early or had
not gone to bed at all. Trees, awnings,
telegraph poles, window sills and r~of lines
were thick with humanity. Bankers
shared space with longshoremen, clergyrmen with the children of the streets.
Women were there in furs and women in
shawls with babies bundled on their arms.
The gaze of all was fastened on the temple
of liberty as intently as, in another century,
was that of acrowd of citizens who.waited
to hear John Adams read what Thomas
Jefferson had just written on the right of
the People to declare themselves free. A
single policeuian was enough to keep clear
the small stand made of scantling timbers
on the pavement near the curb line. Suddenly the voice of all, as if but the voice of
one arose and "There he comes" was the
sound. He had come. Acrosq the portal
of the hall attended by a little-noticed retinue of citizens and officials, down the improvised lane of parting humanity strode
the long, lank, saddened and uncouth
looking man. His was the stature of a
giant. His seemed to be the leanness of
an ascetic. His form was as ungainly as
it was large. His features seemed half
Indian in the rigidity of their structure,
and half Ttalian in the mobility of their
expression. But, oh! such eyes! Dark,.
luminous, penetrating, loving and large.
They shone like the eyes of a deer from
behind a hedge of rock and briar. The
words he spoke are little remembered save
one utterance which he made the comment
of an action. Stretching out his right
arm to a tall pole unnoticed before, he
raised the national ensign to the top. Regarding it fora moment, he said: "Rather
than have one of thesestripes erased or one
of these stars removed, I would be assassinated on this spot." The night before
in the Continental Hotel a messenger from

THE FORUM.
Winfield Scott, the commander of our
armies, and from James Bucbanan, had
told him of a plot to kill him in Baltimore
on the day following, when he was to go
through. How he defeated that purpose
by going through from Harrisburg in the
night time soon became known, but why
was not for a long while understood. The
thought of that danger was in his mind
then. It was the provocation to what he
said. To tell what Abraham Lincoln did
for the United States would be trite ana
needless. But how grateful we should be
that the United States did something for
him. They made him before he remade
them. He was a Kentucky poor white of
obscure extraction. The conditions surrounding his birth were of that patriarchal
character agreeable to the favorites of fortune, but depressing almost to helplessness
to the children of penury and of toil.
White capital owned black labor, but the
labor so owned was, after all, happier than
the whites lacking capital either to labor
or to own labor, and forced to wring out
of nature or contingency barely enough to
live on, by unhonored, little rewarded and
unremitting toil. There was a providence
in this humble birth and hopeless environment. Lincoln was thereby made tender
toward the poor, and considerate toward
the humble. He was thereby brought into
confidential terms with nature and with
human nature. Stirred in him was the
voice of conscience which he obeyed from
the cradle to the grave. He was made
and kept a man of the plain people. Them
he never forgot; him they never forgot.
To them he was incomparable; to him
they were precious, and from them to him
came the highest of their honors. The
hooded destiny which we call events, the
hidden providence which we call fate
moved on the restless instincts, the adventurous spirit and the pathetic wants of his
parents. By the light of hope and the
North Star they took him from Kentucky
to Indiana. There he stayed not long, for
in early manhood he sought the opener
prairies of Illinois. Across them there
came air enough to fill his lungs. They
were settled by Northerners, who appealed
to his principles and who, in turn, were
impressed by his Southern nature and by
his alternately pensive or humorous, but
predominately
pensive temperament.
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History was accomplishing his education
in the school of life. A journey on a fiat
boat to New Orleans gave to him sight of
a slave auction. The arousal it wrought
in him was never lost. The Hawkeye war
was a revelation to him of his power of
leadership. The anti-slavery agitation
from 1854 onward lifted him from a sluggish whiggism into an enthusiasm for
freedom. The rest is history. Known
are the romantic rapidity of his rise, the
adequacy of his powers, the versatility of
his genius, his gift to gild defeat with
anecdote, despair with philosophy, victory
with clemency, power with magnanimity,
manhood with truth, patriotism with
martyrdom and the grave with the glory
of self sacrifice. Much of this was in the
man; much of this was in the United
States for the man. Would bureaucratic
German imperialism have been transformed into freedom by him? Let the
unapprehended Lincolns living and laboring and dying in Germany give the sad
answer "No."
Could he have surmounted in Great Britain the caste and class distinctions which there prevail and have become the civic head of that parliamentary
empire? Theanswer is found in the fact that
no one has ever become the civic head of
that parliamentary system with extraction
so humble and opportunitiesso few as his.
Can any believe that a career of grandeur
and of glory would have opened to him in
fickle, fertile, fortuitous, fantastic France?
While he died at the climax of his fame
and the summit of his power, many of us
wish he had lived on till now. We know
that his counsels, could he speak to us
from the upperskies, would be not for contention, but for brotherhood. Our uillionaires would little impress him. Our
toiling millions would engage the anxieties
of his resplendent heart.
FATHER AND SAVIOR OF THE UNION.

As the United States were all right because Washington was their founder, and
their father, so the United States are all
right because Lincoln was their purifier
and their savior. It is trite to couple the
two, but it is as true as it is trite. The
Virginian and the Kentuckian, the one
the flowery perfection of a social aristocracy, the other the obscure product of
poverty, ignorance and contempt, not only
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both filled the highest office in the gift bf
the people aud attained the highest measure of ambition and of power, but both
lilled that office so well that their records
in it became the superlative expression of
moral achievement toward which others
might struggle, but up to which, none of
them, in public estimate, has ever reached.
They are the entirely heroic quantities in
our national life. Perhaps we idealize
them both, but a nation without ideals is
a nation tumbling down the steeps of
death, just as a man without ideals, but
with consuming ambitions, is not only a
danger to a party and a peril to his country, but a false light on the shores of history to its ingenuous youth, and one whom
the morality and manhood of any political
organization should suffice to extinguish
if our institutions are to endure, and if
our examples are to remain grand and inspiring. On this table land of time, looking back upon the past with gratitude and
upon the future with faith we should rebaptize ourselves in the spirit of the immortal emancipator, and as he did at
Gettysburg, newly dedicate ourselves as
citizens of the United States, of the states
united, to the vow to which he was so
true, and to the duties to which he gave
his life, the vow and the duty that government of the people, not of the machines
for the people, and not for the conspirators
of politics, and by the people, and not by
corrupters of their suffrage, shall not, with
its entail of blessings and obligations, by
any default of ourselves or of our posterity, perish from the earth..
The time I named a while ago is the
only one I ever saw Lincoln; I had not
the heart or wish to look upon him dead,
when, as a student in New York, I gathered with the thousands around the custorn house the morning of his exchange of
worlds.
Patriotic hands had already
draped the stately pillars of that building
with thickest mourning. High up in the
air was a balustrade from which men addressed the people. Tliey talked not to
them of war. The war was over but it
was closed with a sacrifice which made
victory seem a satire and triumph a mockery. Some lashed the crowd to fury.
Others spoke with simply barbarous brutality, excusable to a veritable insanity of
grief and horror. One man alone I recall

who, at that time, said words now worth
recalling. He was comparatively unknown
to the throng, but so overcome were they
by what he said, that they broke him
down-while saying it, and demanded that
he be named to them. He had to stop
until the chairman told them who he was.
lie said that though Lincoln was dead,
law was alive. He declared that the act
of a bravo was neither the deed nor the
sentiment of a section. He declared that
the divine purpose in the mystery would
be revealed. He adjured them to remember that while clouds and darkness were
sometimes the pavilion of the Almighty,
justice and judgment were forever the
habitation of his throne, and that though
the President was dead, God reigned and
the government at Washington still lived.
Thus a mob yielded to a man-master of
them because master of his own soul that
day. Those who heard him went away
heavy of heart, but with reason redominant in them. Incomparably tender, the
eyes of Lincoln seemed looking into mine
down the vista of memory as I stood under the spell of James A. Garfield that
dreadful noon. Years afterward those
words came back to me, oh, how pathetically and reassuringly, when he was himself assassinated only for the crime of desiring to put an agent of his own in that
very building from whose portico he
stilled the wrath of men.
LINCOLN'S HELPERS SKETCHED.
I have brought these two Presidents together in mention, not merely because
both were slain in office, but really more
for contrast than for comparison. Mr. Lincoln has been not irreverently called a
providential man. General Garfield was
a man of cultivation and preparation for
the presidency. They were alike in their
fate, and in the fact that they were nominated by a union of the detached forces in
their party against a leading favorite in
each case. But there the resemblance
ceases. Mr. Lincoln's career had not a
training school in it, no college in it and
but one term of Congress in it. He failed
to reach the United States Senate. James
A. Garfield, although the child of poverty,
was, nevertheless, a product of refining
influences. He was tenderly reared at
home, carefully schooled in academics,
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successfully girded and guided through
college, lovingly trained for the Christian
ministry, deliberately chosen to be the
president of a classical institution, early
elected to the legislature of his state,
quickly appointed to the command of her
troops in the field, promoted to the rank
of major general in the national armies,
chosen for many terms to the House of
Representatives, elevated to the Senate of
the United States and placed in the presidency before his duties as Senator began.
All this was a training for the presidency.
He was as thoroughly fitted by antecedent
educational public service for that office as
Quincy Adams or. Buchanan. He might
have made one of our greatest chief magistrates, because the nation had returned
to normal times and to normal political
methods, and was looking out for providentialmen. Whether he would have been
an opportunist or a statesman, a master of
expediency, or an exemplar of courage
and of principle will never be known. He
died too soon for that to become known.
The power of moral resistance in him
could not. be measured, for his presidential
career ended almost before it began. On
the quantity or quality of that power
would have depended his success or failure in his great office. As to him, the rest
is silence, but the pathos of his death, his
fortitude under suffering and his tenderness in mortal agony for his loved ones
and for his country will make his name
one to stir the hearts of the generation of
men and women who were appalled by the
deep damnation of his taking off.
With the exception of Grant, other representative Americans ofthe war era shine
with reflected radiance. How many members.of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, for instance,
can you name off hand? You can remember Chase, Seward and Stanton, perhaps
Gideon Welles. But do you remember
Edward Bates, Caleb Smith. Montgomery
Blair and Orville H. Browning? Do they
seem larger to you than the average governor? Are many of them abler to you
than the average county judge? Name
them and their departments together. Do
not the depaitments seem greater than the
men ? Estimate of the three cabinet chiefs
whom you do recall is not now difficult.
Salmon P. Chase fretted in the treasury.
Yet that was the only office which made

him famous. He wanted to be President
even against Lincoln, and was made chief
justice to get him out of the way. On the
bench he was neither happy nor specially
distinguished. He still longed for the
presidency, but fdied without the sight.
Our people have an instinctive feeling
against politically honoring judges whose
gowns politichl ambition stirs. Edwin M.
Stanton had a prodigious temper. It
alienated and wounded many good men.
That, however, is recognized now as only
a superficial blemi sh. The intensity of
his patriotism has become as apparent as
its narrowness. He thought it to be as
necessary for the country to be saved by a
certain party as for the country to besaved
at all. The indispensability of a party is
a delusion, of which the strongest men are
capable. Mr. Stanton suffered through
the impatience of his genius. Where he
needed peers of himself he had to be discontented with clerks. MIen there are who
work with their equals or work almost
alone. They cannot pour themselves into
lesser lives. They cannot allow for the
halting habit of slower intelligences. Such
men are peremptory, unpopular, incomparable, indispensable and intolerable.
Bismarck was such a man. Stanton was
such a man. How different from him was
William H. Seward. He played politics
as an art, as well as regarded it to be a
body of principles. He had no personal
objection to political opposition. Even in
war times he did not think a difference of
opinion was a form or a proof of moral obliquity. He had no animosities, little
or large. He classified men, and did not
get mad at them. If they agreed with
him, he used them; if they disagreed with
him, he still used them. Yet he was full
of the courage of moral principle. He carried the conscience as well as the intellect
of the Republican party with him for
many years. He was its admired but unloved hero until Lincoln captured its heart
with his unique ability to state propositions so perfectly that no scholar could improve on them, yet so plainly that even
no blockhead could misdnderstand them.
One cannot talk about Seward without
talking about Thurlow Weed. The two
men were named together too often for the
welfare of the statesman. Mr. Weed had
a monopoly over a party. He claimed a
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monopoly of the right to forward Mr.
Seward in that party. The people which
is now angered to the danger point against
corporate monopolies was then merely distrustful of, and indignant at, the monopoly of the management of its affairs.
They just determined to overthrow Mr.
Weed's monopoly, whether they gained
or lost by doing so, and they did it. Think
how much more morally earnest Sumner
is thought to be than Seward was. Yet
Mr. Sumner was not really more morally
earnest than Mr. Seward. The surrender
of Mason and Slidell against public clamor
and the defense of the insane negro, Freeman, against like clamor, show that William H. Seward was the equal in moral
courage of any statesman we have had.
Men not old here can tell how Seward suffered by his constant quotation with Mr.
Weed. The latter grew pupils who finally
mastered their master.
And now what of Ulysses S. Grant?
Quite lately the tide of hero worship has
rolled in afi ocean of homage at his feet.
There can be no quarrel with this disposition. The tribute is genuine and it is deserved. The people have put themselves
under bonds to posterity to place Grant at
the top of their modern military heroes.
The monunlent in New York ratifies that
estimate for this generation, and will certify itto the confirming future. Grant was
the summation of Anglo-Saxon grit. He
was the incarnation of a Puritan patience.
Like Wellington and Frederick, he was a
man of silence and self-reliance. He was
an evolution of Providence to hammer rebellion to pieces. Many think that he was
a misfit in the presidency, though to him
we owe the veto of inflation and the substitution of arbitration for war. The master of himself and of millions in the field,
he was the victim of credulity in peace.
Business errors, by which any fame less
than his own would have been dimmed,
he so frankly admitted and so heroically
attempted to repair that he drew again the
hearts of the people to his own. Though
romantically rapid in his rise to chief command, he rested his claims on the solid
foundation of rare merit and unequaled
capacity. His magnanimity to the foe was
an object lesson in humanity and statesmanship forever. After his business embarrassments, and to repair them, he fin-

ished with his life's blood memoirs which
Caesar could have been proud to pen, narrating achievements grander than any
Caesar ever wrought. His life is an inspiration; his death in its pathos and heroism is a benediction. Whatever his rank
in civic affairs, he belongs at the head of
warriors of any time.
LEADERS OF THE POST-WAR ERA.
Let us turn a moment from the sword to
the pen. The first citizen of the empire
state in moral elevation of character, and
the most accomplished scholar in American journalism was George William Curtis.
His friendship was an honor. Association
with him was a liberal education in what
mind should think, characterbe and action
and example teach and inspire. Ofallthe
sons of men with whom I have been cast
he was. spiritually, the gentlest. Yet in
defense of principle he had the courage of
a lion, albeit his nature had the fineness of
a woman.
As a moralist he was wise
without prosiness. As a humorist he was
charming without malice. Asa denouncer
of wrongs, his tongue was touched as if
with fire from the altars of God, yet always the sin and never the sinner was the
object of his wrath. As an orator, whether
of criticism or of persuasion, whether of
analysis or of appeal, he was a master of
the art of statement, and a master of assemblies. As a reformer he effaced his
great personal gifts and his extraordinary
powers in the impersonal work of statistiQal study, of committee labor and of scholastic tabulation. Not a flaw is disclosed
by his temper or by his contributions to
literature. His faith in principles, the accuracy of his knowledge, the largeness of
his view, his felicity in detail, and his massive power of generalization match with
the perfection of literary form. Splendid
and many as were the things he did and
said, greater than all of them was the man
himself. His life, while most practical in
all its activities, was dignified by a moral
beauty which made it like perfect music
set to noble words. He loved men, feared
God and had no other fear, lived for others,
honored the state, uplifted his calling and
I am certain that he exchanged worlds
with the serene assurance of immortality.
Nor in some respects as an antithesis
should Wendell Phillips be forgotten. His
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vindictive eloquence was incqmparable.
Its excuse was its infliction upon wrongs,
and the contribution of its wealth to freedom. He .piloried not only statements
but men. He smashed not only evils but
evil doers. His words fell as coldly and as
clearly as ice or pearls, but when they
lighted they burned into the heart of
things as acid burns into the denuded plate
of the engraver. He had no toleration,
but let us admit that he asked none, and,
if possible, received less. The dramatic
habit, what I may call the vice of characterization, the necessity of utterance, the
pas~ion of the platform, the intoxication
of words remained with him to the end.
The exercise of his measureless powers was
prolonged beyond the success of the freedom which was both their client and their
excuse. That exercise led him to espouse
heresies and quackeries as vigorously a
he had espoused justice and liberty. He
became the victim of his own proclivities.
His defects were on the side of his qualities, but his qualities were extraordinarily
great.
How different from him was the intense, the studious, the patient but the prodigious and the invincible William Lloyd
Garrison. He hated slavery, but not its
masters or overseers. He pitied, succored
and rescued the slave, but he did not idolize him nor coddle him. He had a persistence in solitary labor, and a talent for
organization which rarely go together,
and he had them in the highest degree.
When his work was done he was through.
The passage of the Thirteenth and the
Fifteenth amendments was enough valedictory for him. He did not linger superfluous on the stage. lie ceased from his
labors when he knew that his works would
follow him. There were no dissipated
powers, no diverted energies, no wasted
forces, no deranged unities in his fine and
flaming career. His was the terseness of
John Wesley, the imaginative power of
John Bunyan, the moral grandeur of
Cromwell or of Milton, and the common
sense of the Yankee printer.
Nor should I omit from any consideration of the great abolitionists Henry Ward
Beecher. He was a poet let loose in theology. He was a son of thunder in the
pulpit, but withal as gentle as the little
children who loved him, or as the flowers

which he loved, in his personal nature.
The editorial chair was made greater because he sat in it. The lyceum numbers
him among its demi-gods, but the pulpit
was truly tribune, throne aild judgment
sedt to him. He lifted the gospel out of
the mere theology which is but the skin of
truth set up and stuffed into vivid moral
relations with man's duty to God and with
the duties which God requires of man.
There never was a greater personal force
in American oratory. His fame will become more and more traditional as the
years roll on, for his immortality in literature is not assured. Those who passed
under the spell of his eloquence, who were
privileged to sit under the hurtless but
luminous play of his fancy, most of all
those to whom he was an associate, a
neighbor and a friend, will always recall
him as the greatest embodiment of power,
of tenderness, of fancy and of all that goes
to make up -charm and inspiration that
they ever knew.
POETS OF FREEDom.
Nor should a review even so cursory as
this one omit reference to some of our
American singers. Some of them have
affected public feeling only Some have
almost exclusively appealed to public
thinking. Some have, with the gift of
genius, appealed to both. A consideration of the public forces in American manhood cannot regard the poets in a light
purely literary. Many of us, I presume,
would put Longfellow at the head, both
in form and substance, of our sipgers. The
interchange of thought by the AngloSaxon race is attested by the sale of more
of Longfellow's poems in Great Britain
than in America and of more of Tennyson's in America than in Great Britain.
This has only been the case for the last
twenty years, but it indicates that the
lovers of poetry are not provincial or local
or national in their prejudices or their preferences. Nor should it be forgotten that
Bryant, whose poems of freedoni and patriotism are not many, but whose appeals
to these high qualities incidentally made,
divided the time of his muse with the
noble worship of nature and of nature's
God, is less known to the political thinkers of our country as a poet than as a
statesman of affairs, He was agrahd poet,
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whether of original imagination and power
or whether of well nigh unsurpassed felicity in the transference and exaltation of
the greatest thoughts of the greatest singers of other lands and of other languages
into our own. But he was also a painstaking political editor, a shrewd and money
making publisher, an accomplished and
industrious farmer, a scientific botanist
and chemist, and a political counselor of
the first rank. He touched life at many
points. Probably no other country would
have offered room and opportunity for
talents so many and so distinct as his
own. In boyhood a poetical prodigy, he
was in old age a prophet and a singer of
the virtues, and of love of worship as their
crown.
The war and the freedom making era of
the United States were powerfully influenced by James Russell Lowell and John.
Greenleaf Whittier. While the historical
and critical estimate of Lowell will depend upon his ambitious and stately productions, his poems of satire, of dialect
and of humor burned away shams in systems, snobbishness in thinking, cowardice
in policy and wrong in law. He began
his warfare against national evils at the
time of the Mexican War, by which freedom happily secured along the Pacific more
territory than slavery seized along the Rio
Grande. In the civil war his notes were
shrill and high. How effectively they
told no student of the moral forces of that
tremendous time can doubt. But after all
the singer of singers to the heart of America on public subjects was John Greenleaf
Whittier. His muse is always primly
dressed, but it is strong and true and grand.
The Quaker poet knew what people were
thinking about, because that was what he
was thinking about himself. He knew
the feelings of the people for they were
his own. He was able to put into natural
and easy form the love of men and women
for liberty, their abhorrence of injustice
and their aspiration for the golden rule
and for the golden age. Best of all he had
a Garrisonian largeness of spirit. The individual was not hated by him or deified.
The system of wrong was attacked. With
its victims he sympathized. He regarded
the white race, where cursed with mastership and man-owning, as more entitled to
sympathy than even the black race, in

whom manhood was lost in chattlehood.
He best of all realized that compromise
was the capsule of secession. He best of
all saw that the kingship of Southern cotton was the peonage of Northern conscience. He best of all appreciated that
what made the South unspiritual made
the North sordid, and that what made
capital, invested in flesh and blood there,
arrogant, made capital, invested in stocks
and bonds here, sycophantic, brutalized
and snobbish. His own soul was never in
chains. His song dissolved the chains
that bound other souls. While his fame
will probably rest upon his poems of Godhood and of religion, and while they will
endure after our civil war shall have passed
to the small category of a local struggle,
his verses for freedom and for union in
war had the value of armies, and will be
,always the verses by which the generations
influenced by the struggle, will confirm
his claim to their love, and will wear him
in their hearts.
Oliver Wendell Holmes was a poet of
patriotism, too. He was a masterof form
an artist of feeling, a Bostonian through
and through, a Brahmin of his class, but
American, and thoroughly American all
the same. As a scientist and novelist, as
a lecturer and essayist, as a medical teacher
and an editor he contested the field of life
in many of its high departments and always with his peers. But his poems are
the straight avenue which he trod to the
hearts of his countrymen, and that avenue
their memory and love will always keep
open. There are many other singers to
whom reference could be made. The South
and the West were not without their bards
and the war songs of both armies were the
children of the brain of genuine poets.
Happily those war songs have now become the musical property of the people as
a whole, and "Dixie" and "My Maryland"
will arouse the plaudits of New York and
San Francisco, while "John Brown's
Body," his imperceptible knapsack filled
with invisible rations is, with his impalpable soul, still marching through Georgia.
A FEw GR OUPED.
Other men, perhaps little thought of,
must be mentioned in a sentence, and
hardly a sentence can be given to them.
Jenckes of Rhode Island first started the
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now overarching issue of civil service reform. Henry Winter Davis held the border states in line when the issue seemed
against the nation. Stephen A. Douglas,
the most consummately agile politician
that ever lived in America, gave to his
country what he had theretofore only
given to his party, at a time when his
country greatly needed his aid. Thomas
A. Scott, the railroad magnate put down
hundreds of thousands of men and millions
of tons of armament just where they were
needed as precisely and as promptly as
machinery places a corner stone in position.
William L. Dayton labored as earnestly,
to prevent France from helping the South
as Franklin, a century before, had labored
to induce France to assist the Union.
Forget not the ablest, the strongest, the
weakest and the last of the great personal
jotirnalists. As a writer he was incomparable. As a politician he was a child. The
words he spoke for freedom will never die.
The sentiment he aroused for liberty was
invincible. It is forgotten that he engaged
in a phantom pursuit of elusive political
ambition. Horace Greeley was infinitely
larger than his weaknesses. Recall for a
moment the sweetest, the simplest and the
most indomitable Viking of all our seas.
He was a Berseker in battle. More gallant
than Decatur,more victorious than Nelson,
lie was a man without craft. He knew
the fear of God, but he knew no other fear.
He had no consciousness of greatness or of
unusual merit. To him defeat was unthinkable, duty imperative and country
inestimable-the faithful, the gentle, the
incomparable Farragut. The politic Hendricks, while Vice President of the Union,
heard the thanksgiving bells ring on the
other shore. Soon following him, McClellan, in his mountain home, died the death
of the righteous, the soldier, the most beloved of all the chiefs of the North in the
war between the states.
Not longafter McClellan went Hancock,
the superb, and Sheridan, the man whose
dash was Napoleonic, yet whose prevision
or prudence was equal to that of Napier or
of Greene. Nor, in Central New York,
should be forgotten the gracious,the stately
and the Christian gentleman, Horatio
Seymour, who twice administered the
highest trust of his commonwealth and
who made Deerfield the seat of hospitality

for scholars and for patriots and a shrine
for the affections of a great party.
TiLDEx.

There is one of whom I would speak at
length did time permit, for he would be the
topic of an address by himself alone. I
mean the sage of Greystone, Samuel J.
Tilden. He died at over threescore, philosophically the wisest and politically the
wiliest man of his generation. -But he
was as wise in thought, as clear in diction,
as profound in generalization, and as prophetic in foresight at 19 as he was at 70.
For proof read his essays in the Democratic Review, on how and for what men
should vote, before he had a right to vote.
Read his contributions to political literature through all his life, and you will find
two remarkable facts. He had no intellectual growth. That is one fact. The
intellectual development which he showed at the outset of his efforts in authorsh'p was, however, so complete and comprehensive that growth thereafter was unnecessary, if not impossible. Fable tells
us that Minerva was born complete, full
orbed from the brain of Jove. Samuel J.
Tilden, either owing to ancestral causes,.
not set forth in any biography, or to studies to which chronicle has not done justice,
possessed in the flower of his youth the
powers of his age, and saw the future in
the instant, when on the threshold of
manhood, as clearly as when on the verge
of the grave. He was called to the great
duty of governing a state and of being the
leader of a party in a contest for the presidency to which his friends aver and his
opponents well nigh concede he was elected. But he was called to the greater duty
of reforming public abuses, pursuing public malefactors, making them disgorge public plunder, and by that duty a great political organization was rehabilitated in its
functions, both as an opposition party and
as a party for government, and we are
laying this flower of tribute and of justice
upon his green grave to-day, at a time
when that party, never so much as now,
needed a man his equal in mental outsight and in moral insight, and, if may
be, his superior in directness of statement
and in directness of method. But let not
this qualified criticism go to record, without the grateful recognition that upon him
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was conferred the unique honor of ending
a wrong and of renouncing a claim which,
if resented in the one case and'if carried
to final assertion in the other, would have
involved not the disappointment of a party
which could afford to wait, not the defeat
of a man who could afford to lose, but the
renewal, upon a case of disputed title, all
over this nation, and not in a mere section
of it, of a civil war, within eleven years
after another civil war had been waged
around the question of state secession and
of human rights. His self-effacing patriotism should never be forgotten. The
problem of disputed title which the treatment of him placed in our public life is the
greatest problem and the greatest peril of
our institutions. It can, however, be effectively disposed of by making politics
pure, by keeping suffrage undefiled, by
rendering elections honest, counts truthful and public discussion and agitation
constant. These objects kept in view, the
future will be as secure as, in this man's
time, it was ominous and as, to our shame,
in our times it seems still ominous.
BLAINE AND CONKLING.
* Nor in any state should the two names
be forgotten that long filled the public eye
and stirred the public thought. The most
dramatic of partisans was one, the most
magnetic of politicians was the other.
They have not been dead that~length of
time yet to enable the adherents to either
to do justice to the other. Roscoe Conkling and James G. Blaine stood for two
schools of thought in one party.
The
school of the first made party an instrument of power,. the organization the expression of that power and himself the
leader of that organization. The school
of the second made party an instrument of
perstasion, the organization the servant of
the party and himself the idol both of party
and of organization. The one commanded and the other inspired. The first required obedience; the second aroused
affection. The one inspired courage and
admiration; the other stirred enthusiasm
and devotion. Men would follow the New
Yorker as a soldier a chief. Men would
follow the man of Maine as a friend would
follow a friend. The one had a policy, but
shared his plans with none. The other
made every lesser leader his confidant.

The tenure of the first was essentially imperial. That of the second was essentially
personal. Conkling's unlikeness to his
supporters was both a trial and a chhrm
to them. It repelled intimacy while it
created a sort of blind but absolute faith.
Blaine seemed to be a duplicate of everyone with whom he talked, plus the knowledge and genius that were his own. Conkling interested people in him. Blaine
made the people believe that he was interested in them. The first in final analysis
divided mankind into slaves and enemies.
The second poured on even the most casual
scranger an almost exaggerated regard.
You wondered if Conkling really Was so
indifferent to the impression he made as
he seemed. You wondered more whether
Blaine really thought so much of you as
he appeared to do. If you looked deeper
than the surface you found that the first
inherited from his father a haughtiness of
manner that was a bar to ease in him or
in others, while the second had carried the
temperament of sympathy with or impressibility by circumstances and persons
into an art that he could not always redeem when the time for turning its promises into performances came. In the application of their qualities to a number as
large as their party the difference was
made emphatic. Only a few thousand of
his party wanted Conkling to be President,
but they numbered just enough voters to
defeat at the polls the desire of millions
that Blaine should be made President.
There were others aligned against Blaine
in other States and for other causes, but
the Conkling phalanx, acting with them,
yet on its own lines and for its own reasons, made the soil of Oneida County the
grave of the chances of the man whose
body is buried by the Kennebec. In the
legacy each left his countrymen, the distinction is as marked. Mr. Conkling carried the claim of the state organization to
an extreme that wrought in Republicanism a rebellion of manhood against machinehood both in national and state conventions of that party-a rebellion that
lately renewed itself 'in the *other party
with results that cannot be mistaken.
Mr. Blaine personified the right of the individual voter in Republicanism, when
asserting the right of the individual, district in the convention of that party. To
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the cardinal ideals of the party in legislation each was loyal, but Mr. Blaine expounded and enlarged them, while Mr.
Conkling just reiterated and enforced
them. The Maine man made converts.
The New York man stirred those long established in the faith. Men became Republicans under Blaine's arguments. Republicans already became furiously more
so under Conkling's incendiary grandiloquence. The New Yorker's rupture with
his party was as tragic as his surprise,
that his party survived the rupture, was
sincere and amusing. The Maine man's
perennial pursuit of the presidential phantom was pathetic in the highest degree.
Death has set his seal on more disinterested and exemplary men, but never in
America on men who more intensified the
intense qualities of personalism in politics.
GREAT DECADES REVIEWED.
A nation should not be gauged by its stupid eras. A people should not be measused by its mediocre men. This I havetried
to bear in mind. This rule of exclusion
and inclusion aptly has operated. The
last four decades which I have reviewed
have comprised the grandest number of
years ever lived in America. They have
been lived more nobly than any other land
ever lived an equal duration of time. All
previous decades were preparations for
them. The wisdom of these preparative
decades was not more of a help than their
follies. Failures and mistakes count for
much in the economy of life. The finished product of national character is made
up from the raw material of many errors.
Mlan moves in a mysterious way his blunders to perform. Greater men may have
flourished in-the past than during the last
forty years ; but those forty years have this
supreme distinction. They have been
years in which the people have become
greater than their greatest men. Then,
too, the time was ready for the revelations
of wonder and of heroism. They are revelations which our children will hold us
in honor for having seen and made. Thus
it is that from this tableland of time we
have looked back on the recent past. So
looking we have talked to the living present about some of the names and fames
which the future will assign to pedestals in
the pantheon of its respect and love.

Across the view of the four deeadeq
great men, as you have seen, grow as
mountains tower above the plains and
valleys. Like mountains, their forms
come oub in bold relief as we recede from
them. There will be seen not only montane natures, but depressions of character,
as well as elevations. There are swamps
with fetid growths in them, with poison
plants and hideous creeping things in
them. But there are rich meadow lands,
pure, running brooks and perennial
springs to make up both the fact and the
scenery of life. Too fully have many of
these great names, whether mentioned or
suggested, been the subject of praise or of
mourning to admit or to require further
estimate or more than bald suggestion of
them here and now. But take all these.
Take all the others whom quickened
memory will recall to your mind. Then
believe with me that our nation so wonderfully founded, so grandly developed
and so manifestly meant to work out great
results for God, in His intentions concerning this, His world, Which His son died to
save, has had in forty years past, and can
be trusted to have in all its coming crises,
a notable and magnificent number of representative Americans-with a people
greater than any or than all of their greatest men.
THE RELATION OF THE LAWYER
TO THE STATE.
ADDRESS OF FRANK B. SELLERS, JR.

There is a rule of action which applies
with equal force to nations and to young
attorneys; namely, that self-preservation
is paramount to all other considerations.
The elements which go to make up the
trials of an embryo lawyer are too well
known to be repeated. Though the figure
is an old one-that of a ship tossed upon
tempestuous seas-yet truly, in the light
of recent events, it is an apt one, when nations have been taught that a storm is not
the only sea power. The lawyer to win
the fight must be a veritable floating fortress, with the armor of a battleship to
withstand the "big guns" of his profession; the speed of a cruiser, for the maxim
discretion is the better part of valor, has a
general application.
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So after the lawyer has long been waging war it is but natural that the question
should be suggested: "What is there now
in the profession of law for me?"-"What
will be my return for this protracted
struggle?" And surely the success of the
individual by his own efforts is an important consideration. But he, who, through
the instrumentalities of his own labor,
does not use the powers conferred upon
him for the elevation of mankind, has
failed to catch the purpose of life, and it is
this that puts the question of the relation
of the lawyer to the state.
Now it is pretty difficult to say just what
a state is. One has never been seen, and
yet, truly, man is subject to this intangible being, and his life made happy or
miserable in accord with its excellence or
defects. The state has been said to be a
body politic or society of men united together for the purpose of promoting their
mutual safety and advantage by the joint
efforts of their combined strength. The
lawyer is one of this body politic and his
relation to the state may be considered
from two standpoints.
First, as to his relation simply as a lawyer practicing his profession, an adjunct of
the judiciary,- not in the concrete, as his
relation to his clients, to his associates and
to the bench; but in the abstract, or to
society in general.
That the lawyer is an active figure in the
community is discovered even by the most
casual observer: whether the true reason
is also discovered is not so much a certainty. While it may be a mooted question as to what are the properlimits of the
functions of government, it will not be
denied that the protection of person and
property is entrusted to its care. In order
to secure this protection, courts of justice
are instituted by the state, and their efficiency is chiefly dependent upon the legal
profession. Whether it should be so or
not, the possessions of many an individual may be secured or wiped away at the
option of the lawyer, and the continuance
of many a life depends upon his ability
and integrity.
Did you ever think how dependent the
individual is upon the lawyer ? Take, for
example, the civil side of law. Property we
may say, is a necessary concomitant of life,
and yet its exchange is generally controlled

by the legal profession; for while in the
primitive days conveyances were made with
all the picturesque beauty of symbolical delivery, now they call scarcely be effected
without the aid of the lawyer to prepare
the habendum and redendum of the deed.
The phrase, "impairing the obligation of
contracts," would hardly alone, perpetuate the name of James Wilson, had not
the lawyer been in evidence. Recovery
in torts for injury to person and property
is mainly effected through his aid. Even
the death of the client does not end the
lawyer's labors for him, for while it is true
that we brought nothing into this world,
and can take nothing from it, yet with ordinary diligence we can leave considerable
behind, and no man can die with any
satisfactory assurance that his property
will not actually go to his enemies, without seeking the lawyer to prepare his complicated will and settle his estate. But the
individual is even more helpless with the
criminal side of the law than with the
civil, and when once entaugled in its
meshes, the lawyer is generally the only
-one who can help him out. The innocent,
accused, seeks the lawyer to protect him;
the shrinking guilty begs the lawyer to
defend him-who has not seen the power
of the lawyer in a criminal trial!
It would be a reflection upon ordinary
intelligence to show how this dependence
of the individual affects society.
The protection of life, property and, consequently, domestic tranquility, being
then, in a great measure, entrusted to the
lawyer, need it be shown what effect the
character of the legal profession will have
upon society ? As to ability, the lawyer
cannot hope to have a salutary effect if lie
is not competent. Competency is the
watchword of any profession, and,
"Knowledge in law, care only can attain;
When honor's purchased at the price of pain,
If loit'ring, up the ascent you cease to climb,
No start of labor can redeem the time.
Industrious study wins by slow degrees
True sons of Coke can ne'er be sons of Ease."

It is hardly necessary to say that the
lawyer's integrity is of equal importance,
and a high degree of it can only be acquired by the most noble effort. Says
Judge Sharswood, in his Legal Ethics:
"There is perhaps, no profession, after
that of the sacred ministry, in which a
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high-toned morality is more imperatively
necessary than that of the law."
How has the lawyer measured up to this
trust imposed upon him? How has he elevated society by his close relation to it?
His ability, has, no doubt, been at least
equal to that of those who follow other of
the learned professions, and, thanks to the
excellence of the American Law Schools,
it is reaching a higher standard.
The iawyer's integrity in the past may
need some defence. Should the unsuspecting mind by chance come upon a little,
well worn volume, entitled The Lawyer,
in the library of this building-whose obscure position, let us hope, is an indication
of its obsoleteness-he might be put upon
his guard in dealing with this treacherous
individual. A paragraph, which I quote
from the preface, will be sufficient:
"Though some gentlemen of the law may
feel disposed to censure the author for his
observations on the general tendencies of
the legal profession, yet he presumes the
candid and most intelligent of them will
not hesitate to acknowledge, on strict and
impartial examination of the subject, the
justness of his remarks." Let us not flatter
ourselves that such opinions are exceptional. The lawyer is held by the ignorant responsible for half the crime and maladministration in the community; while
even the more enlightened look for a wink
of the eye in dealing with him.
Now there is a rumor that the lawyer
lies, and this is not based alone upon the
fact that at times he may say, while addressing the jury, that the defendant is
either eighteen or ten (when in truth fourteen) depending upon which side of the
case he represents. But we are not aware
of the fact that this virtue is confined to
the legal profession alone: perhaps some
lawyers do lie, so do laymen, and indeed
this practice was so common before the
legal profession had at least attained its
present position, that the Supreme Law
Giver found it necessary to put in writing,
"Thou shalt not lie." The superficial
thinkermakes the lawyer untruthful when
he defends a seemingly guilty party: but
this is scarcely as strong an argument as
that given by Dr. Johnson, when he defended the doctrine of primogeniture by
saying "it made but one fool in the family."

How is the lawyer to pass upon the guilt
or innocence of his client? Is he to determine beforehand without a full dislosure
of the facts, that his client is dishonest and
the other fellow true? If he does he not
only usurps, but goes beyond, the functions
of the court and jury. Many cannot comprehend that the lawyer simply assures
his client the protection that the laws afford him; but let the coming generation
force mankind to acknowledge that the
lawyer's word is as good as his boid. aye
better, for during the early days of his
practice, a lawyer's bond might be rather
a dangerous security.
The lawyer's position is indeed a hard
one, and lie has much to guard against in
order to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession and to prevent the occurrence
of such disgraceful cases as that of Maire's
Disbarment, reported in the Legal Intelligencer so recently as February, 1899, where
thestrength of that old but everapt remark
is most forcibly displayed: "A horde of
pettifogging, barratrous, custom seeking
lawyers is one of the greatest curses with
which any state or community can be
visited."
But lack oi time, that most characteristic trait of American life, and perhaps,
not an unfortunate one from the standpoint of an audience, prevents me from enlarging upon this phase of the subject.
The lawyer has another relation to the
state, which, in its limited sphere, is indeed not less important,-his relation
politically to the state.
A review of the history of our country
will show that by far the greater portion
of the business of government has been
transacted by the lawyer. No one can
read Bryce, that English commentator of
American Institutions, from the Supreme
Court down to the colored club, which
though it has an intermittent organization, regularly appears before election,
clad in all the grandeur of mackintosh
and high hat-I say no one can read Bryce
without being impressed with this relation
of the lawyer to the state. Most Presidents
and the great majority of the members of
Congress have been lawyers. Statesmen,
governors, and state legislators are generally drawn from their ranks. This is not
said in a boastful spirit, it has been fre-
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quently suggested that politics has not
been in the past just what it should have
been.
To the superficial reasoner this prominence in political life is due to the assurance
of the lawyer, but it is not difficult to see
that there is a constitutional reason for it.
America is pre-eminently the country
which believes that plain common sense
is all that is required of her political servants, and hence the logic of events forces
upon us the conclusion, that plain common
sense must be one of the chief characteristics of the lawyer.
Consider the different departments of
government. The judiciary is reserved
for the, lawyer alone, and though originally not a political department, yet the
nature of our government makes it decidedly so. This is one of the distinguishing features between the United States and
other countries. The judiciary is the expounder of our organic law, and politics
will remain largely in the hands of the
legal profession so long as constitutional
questions present themselves. Chief Justice Marshall was one of America's greatest statesmen. The Executive Department
can scarcely be successfully filled by one
who has not a thorough knowledge of interngtional and local laws; intercourse
with foreign nations demands the one;
a proper execution of the laws at home,
together with the use of the veto power,
demands the other.
It will hardly be necessary to more than
mention the fact that legislators will naturally be drawn from the legal profession.
Ordinarily as to the substance of legislation, the butcher, the baker, the candlestick maker, knows quite as much about
his own business and the needs of the community as the lawyer, but there is much
that demands the knowledge peculiar to
the lawyer alone and which must always
make him prominent in legislative bodies.
But if the lawyer has played an important part in government in the past, no
less will be demanded of him in the future.
Says Anthon: "It may be safely averred
that the guardianship of our free institutions is entrusted to the legal profession.
And to no portion of the community can
it be more safely confided than to those
who were the chief instruments in their
formation. With us, therefore, every law-

yer is necessarily a statesman, and consequently the moulding of proper national
sentiment is at every step of his career an
important duty."
It is most essential that a proper conception of government be formed and that the
difference between honest and corrupt
political methods be fully recognized. Engaging in the work of government was not
originally intended under the American
system, to be a permanent business. Men
of ability and integrity were supposed to
be called from their labors from time to
time for the benefit of the common country, the state. Now, however, politicians,
pure and simple (principally simple) without any favorable qualifications, seek unbidden a governmental job--political vultures who circle around for months before
an election, patiently waiting for a morsel
of all that's left of either a dead elephant
or a dead mule.
The corrupt methods in politics have given
us corrupt public servants and this has
been seen most forcibly in the legislaturesas our legislators are so will our legislation
be. Pennsylvania has been no exception;
indeed it might be said that the only thing
that saves the state is the fact that the
Legislature is occupied half the time in
endeavoring to elect a United States Senator and the other half in probing the bribery occasionedby theunsuccessful attempt.
Then too, a new field has opened up before our country which will require statesmen of the greatest patriotism and prudence to properly cultivate; statesmen who
will fully recognize the difference between
manifest destiny and man made destiny.

But an enumeration of the neeas of our
country to a people who are well aware of
them is hardly profitable. The corrupt
methods ofpolitics, the deficiencies in legislation and administration, and the dangers
of our new policy are not unknown to us.
The burden of the elevation of our condition and the solution of these questions
rests largely upon the lawyer.
Here, however, we are precipitated upon
that question which, like Hamlet's mind
is never settled, and which at least once a
year is a fertile source of debate in some
literary society-should the lawyer enter
politics ?
The negative side of this question is
maintained upon erroneous grounds :'First,

lw
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that politics is used in its vulgar sense,
as the art of gaining office, rather than
the science of government: and second,
that it is intended that the lawyer should
jump immediately into politics. Now
everybody knows that the lawyer should
not enter anything save his office door,
(and the Court House if he has an occasion to) during the early years of his profession. First, a lawyer: and a lawyer of
apthority. In the school the law student
gets little more than the theory of the law,
and theory of the law alone, will do a lawyer about as much good as it does those
who stand equal before it, when constitutions says that "all men are created free
and equal."
Should the lawyer enter politics? Of
course he should. It would be a hopeful
sign for America if all her lawyers took an
honest interest in the affairs of government. They must prepare to make some
sacrifice; politics often forgets to award
pecuniary return to the worthy, yet the
high positions of state are not beyond
those who diligently and fairly seek them,
and the qualifications for these positions
may be attained, aye surpassed by the
faithful student of our institutions.
The American system has its faults, but
specific mischiefs can be found in any system. To speak of the imperfections of the
state, is but to point out the frailty of human institutions and the fallibility of
those who work them. Poorly as we
measure up to it, government is a wonderful conception, and it furnishes a splendid
field for noble action. Great advancement
can be made in the future and the lawyer
may take an active part In it. In his capacity as a lawyer he may greatly elevate
society by striving more faithfully to defend the innocent and give justice to the
guilty : while as a political servant of his
country he may raise high the standard
of government and teach us to cherish
our American institutions more than we
have ever done in the past.
What possibilities there are then, for the
lawyer! If he labors to become competent in his profession and ever remembers
the words of our own Chief Justice Sharswood, that "no man can ever be a truly
great lawyer who is not in'every sense of
the word a good man," he may attain
that nobility of character which is reserved

for all who are worthy and may make the
world happier for the relation of the lawyer to the state.

MOOT COURT.
FRANOIS SMITH vs. MOUNTAIN
GAS CO.
Negligence-Escap( of gas- Vigilance of
employees-Question forjury.
Trespass.
J. KiRK BOSLER and WALTER L.
HoUoK for plaintiff.
1. Duty of gas company is to maintain
such system of pipes and fittings as will
prevent escape of gas; also to make regular inspection of such system. Koelsch
v. Philada., 152 Pa. 355.
2. Authorities were charged with
knowledge of escaping gas. Kibel v. City
of Phila., 105 Pa. 41.
3. Leak of gas pipes was proximate
cause of destruction of plants. Oil Ci(y
Gas Co. v. Robinson, 99 Pa. 5.
4. Plaintiff placed in sudden peril is not
liable for mistake ofjudgment. Baker v.
North East Boro., 151 Pa. 234.
J. FRANKLIN RERm and BOBT H.
SIH
for defendant.
1. Burden of proof, to prove defendant's negligence, is on plaintiff. Brownfield v. Hughes 128 Pa. 194; Hoey v.
Gahlenbeck, 121 Pa. 238; Rees v. Clark,
146 Pa. 465.
2. Defendant was not charged with
extraordinary vigilance-simply ordinary
care. Lack of it must be affirmatively
shown. Alleghiny Heating Co. v. Rohan,
118 Pa. 223; Kiebele v. Phila., 105 Pa. 44;
Emerson v. *Lowell Gas L. Co., I Allen
410.
3. Where there is so slight evidence of
negligence that no reasonable man would
infer it Court should direct jury to find for
defendant. Penna. R. R. Co. v. Fries, 87
Pa. 234; P. & R. R. R. Co. v. Scherde, 97
Pa. 4-50.
STATEMENT OF THE, CASE.
Francis Smith of the borough of Wokemay, owns a greenhouse situated on Fountain street. The Mountain Gas Co. maintains a line of gas pipes through the various
streets of said borough, including Fountain
street, and thus supplies houses along the
line with light. Smith's greenhouse is not
lighted with gas. On Sunday, February
12th, the gas pipes on Fountain street
sprang a leak near plaintiff's greenhouse.
The gas continued to escape for five days
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and continued to accumulate in Smith's
greenhouse whereby all of his plants were
destroyed. Smith was aware of the presence of the gas soon after the springing of
the leak, but attributed its formation to
the furnace under his house. After searching diligently for the cause of the presence
of the gas he discovered the leak near his
greenhouse about the time that it was discovered by the gas company which was
five days after it happened. The defendant was aware of the escape of gas on Sunday, Feb. 12th, but did not make any further search for the leak than by inquiring
of several persons on two other streets
whether they smelled gas around their
houses. No such inquiry was made on
Fountain street and nothing was done on
that street towards finding the leak until
five days had elapsed. Plaintiff thought
that his furnace caused the gas and so
continued to think until he discovered that
it was issuing from the ground where the
gas pipes were laid. Defendant found it
out about the same, time and repaired it.
It had been snowing on Sunday, Feb. 12th,
and Monday following. Monday night
and Tuesday the snow drifted and rendered the streets of Wokemay impassable.
The borough- is three-quarters of a mile
long and one-half of a mile wide. Is the
gas company under these 6ircumstances
liable to Francis Smith for the loss of his
plants?
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant moves for a non-suit in
this case upon the ground that the facts
established by the plaintiff show not only
the absence of negligence on the part of
the defendant, but the presence of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Of
course, if the plaintiff failed to exercise the
degree of care required of him by the law,
his action must fall, and the question of
defendant's negligence is of no consequence. We are of the opinion, however,
that in view of the evidence before us, it
would be clearly an error for us to hold as
a matter of law, that the plaintiff was
negligent. It is true, there is no evidence
that he attempted to save his plants by
removing them to another conservatory;
but neither is there any evidence that it
was practicable or even possible, under the
circumstances, for him to do so. True,

also, that he did not notify the defendant
of the escape of gas from its pipes into his
conservatory; but the cause of the collection of the gas -was unknown to him, and
there is no evidence that he failed to use
due diligence in searching for it. How,
then, can it be said that the evidence of
negligence on his part is so conclusive as to
leave no ground for a difference of opinion
among reasonable men? Looking at the
facts in a light most favorable to the defendait, it is at least a question for the
jury. Indeed, if the question -were now
directly before us, we should be strongly
inclined to hold, as a matter of law, that
there is no evidence of negligence on-the
part of the plaintiff whatever. The decision in Stoughton v. Manufacturers' Natural Gas Co., 159 Pa. 64, is a conclusive
answer to the contention of the defendant.
In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the
destruction of his house by fire was the
result of defendant's failure to use due care
in the regulation and control of the flow of
gas through its pipes. It appeared that
the plaintiff, becoming aware of an unusual quantity and pressure of gas, went
down into his cellar to turn it off at his
furnace. The pressure was too strong to
be controlled by the cut-off of his furnace,
but as he stood by the furnace he was within three feet of the cut-off at the outer wall
of the cellar and only had to raise his arm
and turn the valve in order to control the
gas. This he failed to do, and his neglect
of this means of safeky was pressed as
strong evidence of contributory negligence.
The court, however, declared that whether
or not his conduct was, under the circumstances, that of a man of ordinary prudence, was a question that should be submitted tothe jury. The evidence of plaintiff's negligence in that case was very
much stronger than in the case at bar, and
we therefore must decline to hold, as a
matter of law, that plaintiff is chargeable
with negligence.
If it be conceded, then, that the plaintiff
exercised the required degree of care and
prudence, or that ajury might so find,
were the questions submitted to them,
it becomes necessary to inquire if the defendant is chargeable with negligence.
This question too, we believe, must be
answered by the jury. The business of
defendant is undoubtedly of a particularly
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delicate and difficult, not tosay dangerous
nature. It is well known that gas is not
only disagreeable and offensive but positively deleterious to both animal and
vegetable life. It was therefore the plain
duty of the defendant to exercise a high
degree of care in laying its pipes and the
most active and unremitting diligence in
preventing the escape of gas. Emerson v.
Lowell Gas Light Co., 4 Allen, (Mass.)
410; Holly v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 8
Gray (Mass.) 123; Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law, vol. 8, p. 1273.
The jury should be so instructed, and if
they shall then find that the defendant in
the case exercised due care in the construction of its line, and that as soon as the
escape of gas was discovered it used due
diligence, under all the circumstances, to
ascertain where the leak was located and
to stop it; and if they shall further find
that the plaintiff is free from the charge of
negligence contributing to his injury; it
will be their duty to return a verdict for
the plaintiff. Otherwise, they will find
for the defendant. Koelsch v. Phila. Co.,
152 Pa. 355; Hunt v. Lowell Gas Light
Co., 1 Allen (Mass.) 34"2; Holly v. Boston
Gas Light Co., 8 Gray (Mass.) 123.
It is immaterial that in the case at bar
the damage resulting from the leak was of
a nature so unusual that it could hardly
have been anticipated by the defendant
company. Rare as such a result might be
'it was in no sense unnatural or extraordinary, and therefore was not remote.
The motion for a non-suit is denied.
ERSKINE vs. STEELE.
Right of court to grant license-To postpone payment offee.
Appeal.
LIGHTNER and STAUFFER for. plaintiff.
1. Act of 1891 forbids granting oflicense
if fee is not paid within fifteen days.
2. The right to appeal belongs to any
person in legal sense aggrieved. 6 Superior
Court 323.
SHIPMA"

and

KENNEDY

for defendant.

1. To grant or refuse license is entirely
in discretion of court. Toole's Appeal, 90
Pa. 376; Grass' License, 161 Pa. 344.
2. License may be granted for portion
of year. Act of 1859 is not repealed by act
of 1887. Russel's License, 1 Dist. Pa, 267.
Heilig's License, 2 Dist. Pa. 342.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

At the regular license court held January 15th, 1898, the court granted a license
to the defendant, notwithstanding the remonstrance of the plaintiff. The act of
1891 requires that the license fee be paid
within fifteen days thereafter. Steele did
not pay his fee for six months, at the expiration of which time he presented a petition to the court setting forth the reasons
which had caused the delay, and the court
ordered that the license be granted.
Robert Erskine, the remonstrant, thereupon took an appeal denying the right of
the court to do so.
Steele asserts that Erskine has no standing to appeal.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It does not appear whether the license
granted to the defendant was a wholesale
or retail license, and it is therefore impossible to determine whether the case is governed by the wholesale license act of 18.J
or the retail license act of 1887. However,
the provisions of the two statutes, so far as
they apply to a case such as the one before
us, are substantially the same. Section 7
of the Act of June 9, 1891, P. L. 2,57, is in
part as follows: "If any person or persons
shall neglect or refuse to pay to the city or
county treasurer the sum ofmoney directed
in section one or three, within fifteen days
after his, her or their application for license
has been granted by said court, then and
in that case the said grant shall be deemed
and held revoked, and no license issued."
The corresponding provision of the retail
license law is found in section 9 of the Act
of May 13, 1887, P. L. 108.
The plain import of this provision is that
a failure to pay the license fee within fifteen days ipso facto revokes the license.
And the court, although it may exercise
its discretion in acting upon an application,
has no power to extend the time, after defaultin payment. As was said in Wacker's
License, 6 Sup. Ct. 325, "the whole proceeding was founded upon the statute, and
the right to this license ceased when the
applicant made default in not paying within the prescribed time." If then, the second petition of the defendant, filed six
months after the grantingof his license, is
to be regarded as a petition for an extension of time within which to pay his
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license fee and for the issue to him of the
license originally granted, we believe that
the court below erred in granting the petition. We are further of the opinion that
upon the hypothesis stated, the appellant,
who was a remonstrant against the granting of the license in the first instance, is a
perfectly proper party to carry the question to this court. He is a party to the
record, (Kahrer's License, 1 Pa. D. R.547)
and a person whose interests. may be injuriously affected by the decree of the
court below. Wacker's License (supra);
See
Green v. Blackwell, 32 N. J. Eq. 768.
also Ency. of Pr. and P1. Vol. 2, p. 151.
The theory is advanced by the respondent
however, that the second petition was not
for an extension of time and for the issue
to him. of the license originally granted,
but for a new license for the remainder of
the year, under the provisions of section 7
of the act of April 20, 1858, P. L. 365 ; that
whether such application should or should
not be granted, was entirely in the discretion of the court; and that in any event,
the appellant, having made no remonstrance against the granting of the license,
has no standing before this court. A careful application of the statute to the facts in
this case, shows that the theory cannot be
supported. The portion of the section relied upon is as follows: "If the party licensed shall die, remove, or cease to keep
such house, his, her or their license may be
transferred by the authority granting the
same, or a license be granted the successor
of such party, for the remainder of the
year, by the proper authority, on com
pliance with the requirements of the law,
in all.respects except publication, which
shall not in such case be required." In
the first place, this section is a part of the
retail license law only, and it may be that
the license in the case at bar is a wholesale
license. But conceding that it is a retail
license, we have no evidence that it was
issued to the respondent as successor of a
prior licensee who had died, removed or
ceased to keep the house. The license
granted on January 15, was notissued, and
no attempt was made to "keep the house"
or carry on business under it. Whether or
not the house had been licensed prior to
January 15, does not appear.
In view of the circumstances, we are
satisfied that the application was for the

issue of the license originally granted, and
that the court erred in granting the license.
JACOB HARRISON vs. CHAS. HUNT.
Employer and employee-Liability of employer for negligent acts of his em-

ployees.

Action for damages.
SAMLUEL H. MILLER and MARTIN WOLF
for plaintiff.
Hunt, the defendant, had control over
the carter employed by Simpson and over
Simpson himself. He is therefore liable
for the negligence of the carter. Pamler
v. Mayor, Alderman and citizens of Pittsburg, 10 Wright 213; Hunt v. Penna. R. R.
Co., 1 P. F. Smith, 475; Harrison v. Collins, 86 Pa. 153.
Hunt had the right of selection, of the
person against whom to maintain an action for aamages. Kelley v. City of New
York, 11 N. Y. 432.
The question of servant or an independent contractor is a question for the jury.
Hassv. The Phila. &Southern Mail Steamship Co., 88 Pa. 269.
ISAIAH ScHEELINE and ELI SAULsBURY for the defendant requested the following instructions to the jury:
That the relation of Simpson to Hunt
was that of an independent contractor and
until the termination of this relation, Hunt
is not'liable for the negligence of Simpson
or of Simpson's employee. Hunt v. Penna.
R. R. Co., 51 Pa. 475; Allen v. Willard, 57
Pa. 347; Gas Co. v. Lynch, 118 Pa. 370;
Mansfield v. McEnery, 91 Pa. 185; Johnson v. Phila., 139'Pa. 646.
That upon the termination of the relation between Simpson and Hunt, the latter does not become an insurer against accidents on the sidewalks. He is notliable
for an accident unless he had actual or
constructive notice of the defect in the
sidewalk. Constructive notice will not be
implied from the bare fact that the hole
was uncovered fifteen minutes. Harrison
v. Collins, 86 Pa. 153; Dewey v. Detroit. 15
Mich. 307;- Campbell v. York, 172 Pa. 205;
Trickett on Borough Law, 2 vol. 150.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Hunt owned a house on Main street,
Carlisle. His cellar extended under the
pavement in which, three feet from the
curb, and four feet from the front of his
house, was a circular coal hole. He bought
seven tons of coal from Simpson, a dealer,
and directed him to put it in the cellar.
Simpson sent the coal and in the absence
of Hunt, opened the hole, and deposited
through it the coal. The operation took
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half an hour. Simpson's carter, on completing his work, neglected to replace the
cover over the hole, and fifteen minutes
afterwards, Harrrison, a lad fifteen years
old, who was walking on the street, fell in,
injuring himself severely.
OPINION OF. THE COURT.

An independent contractor is one who,
exercising an independent employment,
contracts to do a piece of work according
to his own methods, and without being
subject to the control of his employer, except as to the result'of his work. Bouvier's
Law Dictionary (Rawle's Revision) Vol.
1, p.101 1 . Such, we believe, was Simpson
He was following a recognized independent
calling-that of dealing in coal. The defendant purchased from him seven t6ns of
coal to be delivered at his cellar. The
method of delivery was not stipulated.
The right to advise or direct as to manner
of delivery was not reserved or exercised.
Simpson was free to employ any laborers
that he desired; to make delivery at whatever time he pleased; to transport it in
truck or in cart; to have it deposited in the
bin by means of chutes or by means of
baskets. The only control exercised by
the defendant was as to the result--the delivery of seven tons of coal in his cellar,
pursuant to the contract of purchase.
We do not mean to say that a coal dealer
who contracts to deliver coal is always an
independent contractor. It is a question
of fact in each case. Mullan v. Steamship
Co., 28 P. F. Smith 25; Hass v. Phila. &
So. Mail Steamship Co., 88 Pa. 269. The
purchaser may, in the contract for the delivery of coal, so prescribe the methods of
its execution that no independence is left
to the dealer, and he becomes a mere servant. But upon the record of this case, the
only reasonable conclusion is that the contractor was not deprived of his independent character.
The case of Harrison v. Collins, .6 Pa.
153, bears a close analogy to the one at bar.
The owners of a sugar refinery employed
a master-rigger to remove certain machinery for use therein from a railroad
train to its place in the refinery. In the
prosecution of the work, he opened a coalhole in the pavement in front of the refinery, into which to place a beam to secure a purchase for his tackling. After

this purpose .,as accomplished, the beam
was removed, and the hole remained open
a few minutes, in which interval a lad
walked into it and was severely injured.
The court held that the master-rigger was
an independent contractor and that the
owner of the refinery was not liable for the
injury. The case before us is, we think,
even clearer. In Harrison v. Collins, it
was urged with some force that even though
the employment of the master-rigger was
an independent one, if for the mere purpose of convenience or an easy way of obtaining a purchase, he used the hole with
the implied permission of the defendants,
then for the time being he became their
agent, because the care and control of the
hole was not necessarily incident to his
employment. And if he used it without
implied permission, he was a wrongdoer,
and the defendants, in not protecting the
hole from such acts, were guilty of negligence and liable for any injury resulting.
In the case at bar, the use of the hole in
delivering the coal was undoubtedly contemplated by both parties, and consequently the care and control of the hole was a
necessary incident to the employment of
the contractor. He alone was responsible
for the guarding of the hole, and it follows
that no liability for the injuries to plaintiff
rests upon the defendant.
Judgment for the defendant.
FARMERS BANK OF CARLISLE vs.

WILLIAM JAMES.
N,-gotiability of a note-When non-negotiable although appearingso on its face.
L. L. FRANK and H. W. RUSSELL attorneys for the plaintiff.
1. The note is negotiable. Bristoll v.
Warren, 19 Conn. 7; Ufsdell v. Cunningham, 22 Mo. 124.
2. Failure of consideration is not a valid
defence to the payment of a negotiable instrument in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value. Moorhead v. Gilmore,
77 Pa. 122; Hoats v. Asehlach, 160 Pa. 6;
Phalen v. Mason, 67 Pa. 59.
W. B. RILEY and L. Al. SE3RING attorneys for the defendant.
1. The, note is not negotiable. Huntington v. Hartley, 4 Conn. 124; Bank of
Sherman v. Apperson, 4 Fed. Rep. 25; U.
S. v. White; 2 Hill (N. Y.) 59.
The note being payable on the performance of a condition precedent, it is not a
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promissory note and hence not negotiable.
Burger v. Whitman, 7 W. & S. 264: Kimball and Kunston v. Huntington, 10 Wendali 675.
As the note was made payable only upon
the execution of the conditions upon which
it was given, it is therefore executory and
therefore not negotiable. Am. and Eng.
Encycl. Vol. 4, D. 90; Cornelius Coolidge
v. Ruggles, 15 M'ass. 387.
STATEIENT OF THE CASE.

William James is a storekeeper in the
borough of Carlisle. He contracted with
the Carlisle Advertising Company which
claimed to control the right to put up signs
in the cars of the Carlisle Street Railway
Company, to pay one hundred dollars, in
consideration of which the sign of James
was to be put in the cars of the company
for six months. William James gave the
following note: "On January 1, 1899, I
promise to pay to the Carlisle Advertising
Company or order one hundred dollars for
the privilege of having my advertisements
put in the cars of the Carlisle Street Railway Company for six months from the
date hereof.
(Signed) WILLIAM JAAxxS."
This note was endorsed before maturity
to the Farmers Bank, Carlisle, the plaintiff
in the present suit. One week after the
note was given the Carlisle Advertising
Company lost its right to put up advertisements, and did not in fact advertise as
agreed for William James.
The defendant refuses to pay the note
insisting that there is failure of consideration, which is available against the indorsee, for the paper shows on its face that it
is to be paid on a condition precedent of
which the indorsee by the note itself has
notice.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This case turns upon the question of the
negotiability of the instrument set forth in
the statement of facts. It is insisted that
the instrument shows upon its face that
payment depended upon the performance
of a condition precedent, and that it is
therefore not negotiable. To this we cannot assent. It is well settled that the mere
statement in a bill or note of the consideration' upon which it is founded, or of the
transaction out of which it arose, does not
affect its negotiable character. Siegel v.
ChicagoTrust, &c..Bank,131 Ill. 569; Chace
v. Beheman, 10 Daly (N. Y.) 344; Hoyt v.

Lynch, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 328; Sylvester v.
Staples, 44 Me. 496; Hillstrom v. Anderson,
46 Minn. 382. True, some courts have refused to apply the rule to cases in which
the consideration recited is executory, and
it appears that payment is made to depend
upon the performance or execution of such
consideration. Jarvis v. Wilkin, 7 M. &
W. 410; Dixon v. Mittal, 6 C. & P. 320;
Drawn v. Cherry, 14 L. Am. 705; Chase v.
Kellogg, 13 N. Y. Supp. 351. But careful
consideration convinces us that the instrument before us is not of that class. We
are not informed of the date of the instrument, and consequently cannot tell
whether the period of six months during
which the advertisement was to be furnished expired before or after the maturity
of the note. If the note was executed on
July 1, 1898-just six months before its maturity, it might with reason be urged that
its payment was to depend upon the performance of the consideration. But in the
absence of evidence we cannot assume that
such were the circumstances of the case.
It may be that the instrument was executed on December 1, 1898,-only one
month before maturity, in which case it
would be clear that the parties intended
that it should be payable when due, without regard to the performance or non-performance of the consideration. We would
not be justified, therefore, in saying that
the addition to the note of the words
"for the privilege or having my advertisements put in the cars of the Street Railway Company for six months" was intended to make the payment conditional
upon the display of the advertisement for
the period agreed upon.
Since the instrument is a negotiable one,
the contention that the defense of failure
of consideration is available against an indorsee for value before maturity, must fail.
And the further contention that the recital of consideration put the plaintiff upon
inquiry and that it took the paper with
notice of the failure of consideration, is
likewise unsupported by the facts. There
does not appear to have been the slightest
indication of failure of consideration until
one week after the execution and delivery
of the note, and so far as the record shows,
the note may have been indorsed to plaintiff on the very day of its execution. The
presumption of the law, in such a case,
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would be that the contract would be carried out in good faith and the consideration-performed as stipulated therein. Siegel v. Chicago Trust, &c., Bank, (supra).
Judgment for plaintiff.

note given, although not delivered to thE
plaintiff at the time of making, was for a
just. debt.
The executor, James Henry, of the Henry
estate, maintains, that the note of August
3, 1891, was of a testamentary character,
and the fict that a will was made by the
JAMES vs. HENRY.
decedent on June 12, 1895, revoked the alleged will or note, and thus bars an action
McDONALD for plaintiff.
to recover on the alleged agreement. In
Writing was not testamentary and there order to understand clearly the difference
was a contract formed. Bristolv. Warner,
between a contract and a testament, we
19 Conn. 7.
quote from an able opinion of Justice WilBROo s and BASEHIORE for defendant.
liams in Cawley's Estate, 134 Pa. 628, in
Instrument was testamentary and was which he says "the binding force of a conrevoked by the subsequent will. Graham
tract comes from the aggregatio mentium
v. Graham, 34 Pa. 481.
of the parties. The binding force of a will
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
comes from the fact that it is the last exWm.Henry on Aug. 3, 1891, wrote a pressed purpose or wish of the testator in
note reading thus: "At my death, but not regard to the disposition of his property
before, my executor will pay to Henry after his death."
James $5000.
(Signed) Vm. Henry,"
The case at bar was an agreement beAug. 3, 1891. The consideration for this tween William Henry and Henry James
note, was an agreement by Henry James to do some particular thing. The one
to go to London and transact certain, busi- party executed a note payable after his
ness for Wm.Henry. The business was death, the consideration of which was
transacted. The note was not delivered something to be done by the other. Had
to Henry James but was kept by the writer, this contract been a will, the testator alone
who said to Henry James, that he would could have revoked, or changed it whenretain it, and see that it went with his ever he chose, and it would not become
papers to his executor, and that the sum binding upon him, or his estate until
would be forthcoming from his estate. after his death. Are we then to suppose,
James Henry was appointed executor by because this contract was not to be comwill written June 12, 1895. On William pleted, or payable until after the death of
Henry's death, Aug. 3, 1898, his papers, the testator, that it became a testament,
including the note, passed to the possession and was revoked by the subsequent will?
of James Henry. The latter admitting the Surely not. The intention of both parties
possession of the note, and giving a copy in this case is very apparent. Although.
of it to Henry James, declined to pay it. the note did not pass into the hands of the
This assumpsit was then brought on the payee, but by agreement, the maker-agreed
to have the note pass with his other papers
alleged contract.
into the hands of his executor, and the
OPINION OF THE COURT.
money would be forthcoming from the esThat this was a contract between Wm. tate. Then we have a right to assume that
Henry, the testator, and Henry James, the decedent, himself, did not intend that
plaintiff in the above suit, needs hardly to the note should be a testamentary dispobe questioned. The note written on Aug. sition. The contract then was absolute
3, 1891, by William Henry payable at his and passed a right to the amount mendeath to the plainti, is only evidence of tioned in the note and thus became a just
the alleged contract, the consideration debt against the estate of William Henry.
(if
which was that the plaintiff was to go
In the case of Bristol v. Warner, 19
to London and transact business for the Conn. 7, where an action was brought on
said William Henry. Evidence shows a promissory note payable after death of
that the work was done by James. This the maker, it was held to be an obligation
agreement was intervivos and operated ac- and not a testamentary disposition, andthe
cording to the intention of the parties. The same doctrine is held in Shields v. Mifflin,
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3 Yeates 389. Worth v. Chase, 42 N. Y.
362. In these cases the action was brought
on notes given by makers, who were also
testators, and as the case at hand is an action on the alleged contract we are of the
opinion that the same doctrine will hold
in this cause and the plaintiff can recover
on the alleged contract.
Judgment therefore must be entered for
the plaintiffto the amount of $5000.
FREDERICD. OILER, J.
IN THE SUPREME COURT.

The paper, in which William Henry directs his executor to pay $5000 to Henry
James, is testamentary. Not only is the
money to be paid at death, and by the
executor, but the paper is retained by William Henry. The retention of it, is conclusive that he did not intend it to take
effect, as a contract, in his lifetime. Tozer
v. Jackson, 164 Pa. 373, 381. It was retained
purposely, in order that with his other
papers, it might go to his executor. It is
as plainly testamentary, as was the instrument in Frew v. Clarke, 80 Pa. 170; f.,
Tozer v. Jackson, 164 Pa. 373.
The date of this paper was Aug. 3, 1891.
On June 12, 1895, a will was written,
wherein James Henry was made executor.
It was tacitly assumed by counsel and the
learned court below, that this will revoked
the paper. We do not understand why.
The contents of the will are not shown
us. It would not repeal an earlier will,
unless it expressly declared the earlier revoked, or unless its provisions were inconsistent with the earlier. That it thus declared, or that it was thus inconsistent, we
cannot assume.
If then we assume (1) that the paper of
Aug. 3, 1891, is a will, and (2) that it was
not revoked by that of June 12, 1895, it
follows that the former, as a will, may be
admitted to probate, and, if after paying
debts, there remain assets enough to satisfy
it, the executor must pay the legacy of
$5000 to Henry James. But, no action can
be brought for any legacy without probate
of the will. Toner v. Taggart, 5 Binn,
490, 496. Had there been a probate, this
action could have been sustained, Sec. 50,
Act Feb. 24, 1834, 1 P. & L. 1512;.Gilliland
v. Bredin, 63 Pa. 393.
Thelearned court below, concluding that
the paper of Aug. 3, 1891, would not, as a

note, support an action, and assuming, apparently, that it was not a will, treated it
as a declaration or admission, by the decedent, of a contractual obligation to pay
$5000, and permitted a recovery on this obligation. It is indeed quite clear that there
was a contract between William Henry and
Henry James. But what was it? James
agreed to go to London and there transact
business for Henry, and for this agreement
the consideration was the execution of the
paper, and its transmission, with Henry's
other papers to his executor.
Henry
undertook, therefore, to write this paper
and cause its delivery to his executor, for
,performance, i. e. he contracted to bequeath
$5000 to James. Contracts to bequeath
and devise are not unknown to the law.
They are valid. If not kept by the decedent, an action will lie against his administrator for damages. Thompson v. Stevens
71 Pa. 161; Kings' Estate, 150 Pa. 143;
Trickett Limitation, 281. Ifhe bequeaths
as he promises to do, he performs his contract. According to our interpretation of
the transaction, Win. Henry bound himself to make a bequest of $5000 to Henry
James. He wrote the bequest. He retained it, as testators usually retain wills,
and as James agreed that he should, until
his death, and it has come to the executor.
The contract made, has been performed. It
remains, now, to compel the executor to
pay the legacy. As we have said, this assumpsit, on the alleged contract of the deceased, is not the method in which to
compel him. The note of Aug. 3, 1891,
must lie probated, and then the executor
may by appropriate steps, either in the
orphans' court or the common pleas, be
compelled to pay the legacy.
The payment of the $5000 was not to be
made until the death of Win. Henry. No
breach of contract occurred until then. As
six years have not run, since that time,
the learned court below properly decided
that the statute of limitations was no bar
to the action.
Judgment reversed.
AMES vs. PHILA. & READING RY.
CO.
SLOAN and IENEDY for plaintiff.
Railway company cannot abandon the
road constructed under a franchise. People
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v. Albany & Vt. Ry. Co., 19 Howard Pr.
Rep. 523; s. c., 24 N. Y. 261.
Where one party induces asecond party
to make expenditures, the first party is liable if he withdraws the inducement.
McKillip v. AlcIlhenny, 4 Watts 317.
McDONAiD and BROOKS for defendant.

Railway company is not obliged to run
its trains at a loss to accommodate parties
alone the line. Comm. v. Fitchburg R.
R. Co., 78 lass. 180; People v. Vt. and
Albany R. R., 24 N. Y. 261.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The Philadelphia Railroad Company
built an extension to their then existing
lines of railroad. This branch either passed
through or near to land which was owned
by Ames, so that by reason of the extension he was induced to build a furnace on
his land. This he operated succcssfully for
several years, indeed until the company
ceased to operate its road. The furnace
then
became worthless.
"This
action is brought to determine
whether the Phila. Railroad Co. is liable
to Ames for the value of his property.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

We must presume that the extension
was built under the authority of the act of
April 4, 1868, 2 P. &. L. 3926, which authorizes any company incorporated under
this act to construct such branches from
its main line as it may deem necessary to
increase its business and accommodate the
trade and travel of the public.
The nature of a corporation formed for
the purpose of building a railroad differs
from a company incorporated for the purpose of manufacturing by reason of its
many prerogative privileges. The primary
object and purpose of the creation of this
species of corporations, invested with such
peculiar and extraordinary powers, is the
great advantage the public is to derive
therefrom. In return for these privileges
the company owes certain duties to the
state which it cannot shirk or evade. If
these duties are not performed the state
may withdraw the powers granted. The
powers are derived from the state; for their
nonuser or misuser the company is amenable to the state. •
Upon what does the plaintiff in this action base his claim? In order to be successful in establishing a cause of action he
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must show either a breach of contract, express or implied, or a breach of duty.
Was there a contract, express or implied?
We think not. The road was built before
the improvement was made. We have no
evidence of a contract binding the company to operate its road either for a specified time or indefinitely after the improvement was made. The fact that the company transported the products of the furnace for a number of years, does not raise
an implied agreement to continue.
Where A uses his property in such a
manner as to increase the value of B's
property, which increased value, may be
a benefit to A, the mere acceptance of this
benefit by A does not raise an implied
agreement on the part of A to so continue
the use of his land so as not to decrease the
value of B's.
Was there a breach of duty? The
People v. The Albany & Vermont R. R.
Co., 24 N. Y. 267, is authority for the
answer that there was not a breach of duty.
Quoting from the opinion of Wright, J.
"The only remedy where there has been a
total abandonment and a nonuser of the
corporate powers is an action by-the people
to vacate the charter or annul the existence of the corporation." Kinevly v. St.
Louis, Kansas City & Northern R. R. Co.,
69 MNo. 667, is a case where an action was
based upon a state of facts almost analogous
to those of the case at bar. The well
chosen words of the Judge are applicable to
thefacts now under consideration. "Whenever an action is brought the plaintiff
must show that the duty is imposed for
his benefit, and when the duty is imposed
for the benefit of another or for the public
benefit and his own advantage is merely
incidental and no part of the design of the
statute, no such right is created as forms
the subject of action." Here it is evident
that the construction of the road and its
maintenance were authorized only for the
public benefit and not for any individual
composing the public. So that as between
the plaintiff and defendant compaby there
is neither breach of contract nor breach of
duty and consequently no right of action.
At page 1013, Vol. 2of Rights, Remedies
and Practice we find the following: "An
action will not lie for damages sustained
by the abandonment of an old line or the
withdrawal of its trains therefrom, in the
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absence of a contract between the railroad
and the complainant that the company
should continue to maintain its road or
run its trains."
Basing our opinion upon the above authorities, we come to the conclusion that
the plaintiff in this suit has no right of action. Judgment is entered according to
the above opinion.
Miller J. G., J.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The judgment of the learned court of
common pleas is sufficiently vindicated by
its opinion. Judgment affirmed.

MARSHALL vs. STONE.
A. P. KATZ and W. A. VALENTINE attorneys for the plaintiff.
1. This action is not barred by the Act
of Mar. 27, 1713, as the plaintiff was ignorant of the fact that he had a cause of action
until the time John Marshall was prosecuted.
Trickett on Limitations 266;
Lichty v. Hugus, 55 Pa. 434 ; Foxy. Cash,
11 Pa. 207.
2. Stone's fraudulent representation
concerning the payment of the money prevents the statute from barring the action.
Lanphy v. McElroy, 104 Pa. 265 ; 'McCoon
v. Galbraith, 29 .Pa. 273; Wickershan v.
Lee, 83 Pa. 416.'
3. As the money was not used for the
illegal purpose for which it was intended
and the contract is still executory, Marshall
may rescind it and recover. Peters v.
Grimm, 149 Pa. 163-5; McAlister v. Hofl"
man, 16.S. & R. 147; Rust v. Barr, I Watts
110.
W. W. JOHNSON and L. R. HOLCOMB
attorneys for the defendant.
1. An action will not lie on all agreements entered into for the purpose of compounding acrime. Partridge v. Hood, 120
Mass. 403; Collins v. Lane, 80 N. Y: 627.
2. An agreement is consideration of
shifting or compounding a criminal prosecution or proceeding for a felony or misdemeanor of a public nature is void and no
recovery can be had. Riddle v. Hall, 99
Pa. 116; Lestapers v. Inghram, 5 Pa. 81;
Chestnut v. Harbaugh, 72 Pa. 473; Bluttenburg v. Holman, 103 Pa. 555 ; Gamman
v. Keyes, 137 Mass. 583.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Stone, a physician of Marshall's family,
in great confidence was told that his son,
in 1889, had caused a recent fire of a barn
in the neighborhood, and that the owner
was aout to prosecute the son. He said
further that he thought he could induce

the owner to desist from prosecuting for
the sum of five hundred dollars and offered
to do his best if Marshall would intrust
the affair to him. Marshall paid him the
five hundred dollars. Twenty-two months
afterward the owner prosecuted the son,
who was, however, acquitted. Stone had
never spoken tb the owner and had kept
the money.
On several occasions when Marshall inquired of him what he had done he said
that he had paid it over to the owner and
that there would be no prosecution. After
the acquittal of the son, Marshall, seven
years and four months after he had paid
the money to Stone, brought assumpsit to
recover it back.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
J. ANNA RADLE, P. J.
That the action is not barred by the
statute of limitations is apparent. It has
long been decided that where the existence
of a debt or breach of contract is concealed
the fraud or trickery of a defendant, the
statute will not begin to run against the
plaintiff's right of action until he has discovered or should have discovered that he
has such a right. Trickett on Limitations,
p. 256, Lampey v. McElery, 104 Pa. 265;
McCoon v. Galbraith, 29 Pa. 293; Webster
v. Newbold, 41 Pa. 482, and others cited
by counsel.
In this assumpsit the plaintiff, Janies
Marshall, seeks to recover $500 which he
paid to the defendant, John Stone, on what
it is alleged, was an agreement contrary
to public policy because tending to obstruct or defeat justice and, consequently,
illegal. It is a well settled principle of the
law that no action will lie to enforce an illegal contract; yet, under some circumstances, actions will be permitted in disaffirmance of them.
Ordinarily, when
one has paid monley under an illegal contract he will not be permitted to recover
the amount so paid. The law will not
encourage him to defy her mandates by
enabling him to indemnify himself, but
leaves him in the position in which he has
placed himself by his wrongful act. There
are exceptions to this rule, however, and
one of them is, in the case where the contract is still executory, except for the mere
payment of the money and is not of such
a character that the illegal object is ac-
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complished by such payment of money,
and is malumprohibitum and not malurn
in se. In these cases the person paying
the money will be permitted to rescind the
contract and recover the amount he has
paid. Clark on Contracts, 776; Addison
on Contracts, Section 1412.
Was the contract between Marshall and
Stone executed or executory? The defense maintains that the money was to be
used for the purpose of corruptly inducing
the unknown prosecutor to desist from
prosecution of John Marshall. Ifthis view
be correct then Stone, havihg never fulfilled his obligations by putting the money
to this use the contract is still executory.
Most of the cases cited by the counsel
are lottery or gambling cases, and are not
of the nature to assist materially in the
judication of the question involved in this
controversy.
The Pennsylvania Reports are barren of
cases where the point at issue has been directly raised. In Volume 3, P. and L. Digest of Decisions, p. 4160, B persuaded A,
who was convicted of a statutory felony
that if he, A, would advance $1000 he
would prevent sentence from being pronounced. .A gave B two notes for five
hundred dollars, one of which was paid,
the other not. A was sentenced and confined to the penitentiary. A then brought
suit against B for the recovery of the five
hundred dollars. B set up the illegality
of the contract, claiming that the parties
being in pari delicto, no recovery could be
had. It was held, however, that B had
brought about the agreement by falsely
persuading A that he could accomplish an
impossible thing, and hence that he, A,
could recover the money paid upon the
agreement.
In the case of the Express Company v.
Reno, 48 Mo. 264, an action was brought
for the recovery of money paid over to the
bank for the purpose of securing the pardon of Reno who had been sentenced to
the penitentiary. The money had not
been used, however, to consummate this
illegal agreement, and the court permitted
a recovery on the ground that while the
contract was still executory, the party
paying the money might rescind and recover back what he had paid.
Stone came to Marshall with a lie in his
mouth. The subsequent acquittal of John

Marshall at least proves that he was not
legally guilty. Whether Stone believed
he was or was not we have no means of
determining to a certainty. But his subsequent fraudulent conduct leads us to the
belief that he was aware of the untruthfulness of his statement. After procuring
this money from Stone he fraudulently asserted at various times that he had used
it in efforts to prevent the prosecution.
His actions from the beginning to the end
were filled with deceit and fraud, and it
cannot be said that Marshall was in pars
delicto to him.
But it is not necessary to base the decision of this case upon illegality of the contract. If two constructions may be placed
upon the contract and one of them would
make it legal while the other would make
it illegal it is manifestly the duty of the
court to give it the construction which will
make it legal. It is not to be presumed
that persons contemplate a breaking of the
law when their acts can be otherwise interpreted.
There has been no evidence in this case
to show that Marshall had any intention
of doing an illegal act. His son was accused of committing a felony and it was
only natural that he would be greatly concerned and use any and all proper means
to prevent his prosecution. It would not
be unlawful for'him to attempt to persuade
the prosecutor to refrain from prosecution,
nor was it unlawful for him to get others
to do so. Stone informed him "that he
thought he could induce the owner to desist from prosecution for $500," and that
he would do his best if he would intrust
the matter to him.
Why should we believe that Marshall
intended that this money was to be used
for the purpose of corruptly bribing the
prosecutor to refrain from prosecution,
rather than hold the more charitable and
legal view: that Stone being an influential
man in the community, for a fee of $500
was willing to turn his time and attention
to using all proper and lawful means to induce the owner to refrain from pushing the
case against John Marshall?
Why should Stone not urge that there
was a question of the boy's guilt, that even
if guilty, a prosecution and conviction
would probably result in the ruination of
his life, etc? And why should he not re-
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ceive a compensation for his lost time and
the consequent detriment to his business
in doing this?
It is true that the evidence shows that
Marshall asked Stone "What he had
done," and Stone replied, "that he had
paid this money over to the owner." But
this proves nothing more than that Stone
deceived Marshall. The agreement then
being legal, and as the evidence shows
that Stone never fulfilled his part of it,
having failed to make any efforts to consummate his plan of inducing the owner
to refrain from prosecution of the son, we
feel no repugnance whatever in permitting
a recovery for the plaintiff.
Judgment for the plaintiff for $500.
IN THE SUPREME COURT.

The court has divided upon the right of
the plaintiff to a recovery, each judge writing an able opinion in defence of his view.
One of the judges has been the more largely influenced by the iniquity of Stone in
using the fears of Marshall for the purpose
of getting money from him; the other, by
the Impolicy of Contracts of the kind made
by Marshall and Stone, and of so far tolerating them as to assist either party to
them, as against the other.
We are to assume that young Marshall
was, in fact, innocent of the arson. There
was however a lire. Some one was guilty
of it. It is important that the guilty
should be discovered. If the suspected are
not tried, conviction will be impossible.
Marshall's contract with Stone was evidently made in order to prevent a trial of
his son, whether he was guilty or not, and
whether the procurable evidence should,
or should not, justify the prosecutor in
making the information. That the public
will suffer a detriment if money is paid to
such as would otherwise become prosecutors for just cause, in order to dissuade
them from prosecuting, needs no argument
to prove.
It does not appear whether the $500, or
ally part of it, was to be used by Stone in
inducing the owner of the barn not to prosecute, or whether it was simply the price
paid to Stone for his influence upon thi
owner. In both cases the contract would
be equally pernicious to the public. In
the former the noney is expected to be one
of the influences employed on the owner;

in the latter, it is the inducement to Stone
to exert other influences upon him.
There are cases that encourage the repentance of a nefarious or unlawful act,
by permitting a party to recover property
parted with before there has been a full
opportunity to carry out the act. Marshall demands hisz money back after the
object has been frustrated, and seven years
and four months after he had paid it to
Stone. It would require a large charity to
discover in his conduct any repentance,
except that which every man has who,
when he has paid money to another, for a
piece-of work, which the payee has neglected to do, seeks to recover the money.
ThQ cause of the present action, seems to
be, rather disgust at the failure of Stone to
do what he promised to do, than repentance of an anti-social bargain, and the desire to withdraw from Stone the motive
for frustrating the operation of criminal
justice. In Peters v. Grim, 149 Pa. 163;
McNaughton v. Haldeman, 160 Pa. 144,
money left on margin with'a stock broker
was held to be recoverable by the depositor, before the broker had been ordered by
him to do anything. But the money was
given to Stone, either as a reward in advance, for work that he engaged absolutely to do; or as a means to influence the
prosecutor, with the use of-which, for that
purpose, Marshall did not interfere.
In some cases, parties to an illegal contract are found by the courts to be in unequal fault, and the less guilty of the two
is permitted to recover what he has paid
to the other, although there has been no
repen tance. Duvall v. Wellman, 124 N.
Y. 156; Belding v. Smythe, 138 Mass. 530;
Clark Cont. 499; Foley v. Greene, 14 R. I.
618. Marshall's paternal love and solicitude for his son were wrought upon by
Stone for Stone's own advantage. A more
than Spartan harshness of character might
have enabled Marshall to let the law take its
course. He is not to be severely censured
for loving his son more than he deprecated
the general weakening of the criminal arm
of the state that would follow on his act.
For Stone who basely imposed on his devotion in order to gain a sordid-advantage,
no reprobation can be too strong. It would
far more hurt the influence of the law to
allow a blackmailer to retain the fruits .of
his rascality, than to permit Marshall to
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recover them. Stone's motive for engaging in similar enterprises in the future
would be less strong. We are not convinced that the frank adoption of the principle that when X extorts from the affection of a parent, a sum of money, ostensibly to rescue his child from ignominy
and punishment, but really to enrich X,
X shall not be permitted to retain the illgotten prize, will produce nearly as much
detriment to the state as the promulgation
of the impunity of such blackmailers
when once they have obtained the money
from their prey.
Smith v. Blackley, 188 Pa. 5.50, differs
from the case before us in important respects. No prosecution of the son was in
fact intended by anybody there, and the
money was obtained from the father, by
the false assertion that it was. The contract was held not to fall under the ban as
illegal, because, in order to make it such,
there must have been an intending prosecutor. In the case before us, there was a
crime, and the son has been in fact prosecuted for it. The owner of the barn was a
definite person, and he has in fact made
the information. But, we think the plaintiff as not inparidelicto with the defendant may recover the money which he paid,
and for which the defendant probably
never intended to give, and in fact has not
given any consideration.
Let judgment be entered on the case
stated.
GARBRICK vs. GENTZEL.
JA sS O'KEEFE and H. W. RUSSELL
attorneys for the plaintiff.
1. If there has been the use of an easement for twenty-one years, unexplained, it
will be presumed to be under a claim of
right and adverse. Garrett v. Jackson, 20
Pa. 331; Stiffy v. Carpenter, 37 Pa. 41;
O'Keson v. Patterson, 29 Pa. 22; Price v.
Cloud 42 Pa., 102; Ruter v. McJenkinson,
8 Pa. Aup. 164.
2. An action will lie for the disturbance
of an easement which one rightfully enjoys. Hall v. McCaughey, 51 Pa. 43;
Campbell v. Wilson, 3 East. 294.
H. J. SHELLENBERGER and HEsS attorneys for the defendant.
1. A licence is revocable at will of grantor unless made for a valuable consideration. Stephens v. Stephens, 11 .1Met. 251.
2. An easement cannot be acquired no
matter how long he may have used a right

of way If it is done with consent of owner
and he retains right to retake the land.
Trickett on Limitations, 10 Pa. 126.
Damages even though it be an easement
can only be recovered for actual expenditures. McLaughlin v. Cony, 77 Pa. 129.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

George Garbrick and J. B. Gentzel are
respectively the owners of two farms which
are separated from each other by a lane
sixteen feet in width. The fences on either
side of this lane (sixteen feet apart) have
always been recognized as the boundaries
thereof. Indeed this space has been open
and used as a lane by the parties or their
predecessors for a period of from thirty to
sixty years. No difficulty was experienced
between the parties until three years ago,
when for some reason an enmity was engendered and has since existed. About
one year and a half ago, Mr. Gentzel
moved the fence, which separated and
marked the line between his farm and the
lane, out into the lane a considerable distance (presumably eight feet) thereby closing up and destroying the full use of the
lane and rendering it impossible for Garbrick to pass through this narrow space
when hauling his grain, etc.
George Garbrick bring3 this action in
trespass to recover damages for his encroachment.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Before John and Henry, JJ.
It has been insisted upon by the counsel
for the defendant in this case, that this action has been wrongly brought and that
the action of ejectmentis the only one that
will properly lie. We believe this holding
to be obviously untenable; for clearly a
tort has been committed and an action ex
delicto must therefore lie. True an action
of ejectihent might, with propriety have
been brought, and satisfaction meted out
to the injured party, but we believe that
the logical order has been pursued by the
plaintiff. If the plaintiff is successful in
this action of trespass, his legal right in
this matter will be established and to compel (by ejectment) the defendant to move
the fence back to its proper line will be a
matter of course and mere form.
The defendant further argued that the
use of the lane was by virtue of a licence
and, therefore, if the parties could be
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placed in statu quo in Pennsylvania it
would be revocable at any time. We are,
however, constrained by the facts set before
us to believe that the enjoyment of this
lane was by grant, or in the nature of an
easement. The statement of facts in this
case gives us no light on the question as to
when and how the use of this lane was initiated. We do know, however, that there
has been an adverse (adverse as to each
other) and uninterrupted user of this way
for a period of more than twenty-one years.
Upon this point, in the case of Garrett v.
Jackson, 20 Pa. St. 331, Black, U. J., says:
"Where one uses an easement whenever
he sees fit, without asking leave, and without objection, it is adverse, and uninterrupted, and adverse enjoyment for twentyone years is a title which cannot afterwards
be disputed. Such enjoyment without evidence to explain how it began, ispre-sumed
to have been in pursuanceof a full and -unqualified grant. The owner of the land
has the burden of proving that the easement was under some licence, indulgence
or special contract inconsistent with a
claim of right by the other party."
In Trickett on Limitations, 164-7, citing
Schnable v. Koehler, 28 Pa. St. 181, we
find, "Two adjacent owners may set their
fences from their line and so form a lane,
each by adverse user, acquiring the right
to use the other's half in conjunction with
his own as a way." See also Steffy v.
Carpenter, 37 Pa. St. 41. The right of the
plaintiff to the full use of the lane is established by the sufficient long user of, as
in this case, from 30 to 60 years. The defendant stands answerable in damages for
the injury, but no special damages being
shown, the jury will find only nominal
damages in favor of the plaintiff.
By the Court, A. F. John, P. J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

A lane sixteen feet wide, and enclosed
by parallel fences, one of which was on
Gentzel's land, had been maintained at
the margin of this land for more than
thirty years before the change of the line
of the fence by Gentzel, eighteen months
ago. During this long period, Garbrick
and his predecessors in the ownership of
his tract have had a passage over this lane.
Whether any right to such passage was ac-

quired, prior to this user, the user if adverse and continuous, would, itself, create
Trickett, Limitations, 163;
such right.
Demuth v. Amweg, 90 Pa. 181.
The removal of the fence, by Gentzel, so
as to narrow the lane, and prevent Garbrick's passage, was a violation of his right.
How is this right to be vindicated. Garbrick might have removed the fence, and
compelled Gentzel to bring trespass, in
order* to test his justification. Kurtz v.
Hoke, 172 Pa. 1.65; Overdeer v. Updegraff,
69 Pa. 110; Hartman v. Fick, 167 Pa. 18.
He has not done so. Should he have
brought an ejectment? Ejectment postulates the possession of land by the defendant and the right of possession of it in the
That the defendant has the
plaintiff.
possession avails not, unless the plaintiff
has a right to take it. Doubtless, since the
inclosure of a part of the lane by the new
fence, Gentzel has been, as he remains, in
possession of this part of the lane. But
Garbrick has no right to the possession of
it. Fugitive'passage over it from time to
time, without obstruction, is all that he
claims. To vindicate this claim, ejectment
Union
is not the appropriate remedy.
Canal Co. v. Young, 1 Wh. 410, 424; Black
v Hepburn, 2 Y. 331; Slegal v. Lauer, 148
Pa. 236; Hancock v. McAvoy, 151 Pa. 460;
Union Oil Co. v. Bliven Oil Co., 72 Pa. 173.
The action by which rights to easements
might be vindicated at common law, was
trespass on the case; for which by the act
of 1887, trespass has been substituted. The
cases in Pennsylvania in which this
remedy has been employed, are quite numerous; Arnold v. Cornman, 50 Pa. 361;
McKee v. Perchment, 69 Pa. 342; Hall v.
Coughey, 57 Pd. 43; Demuth v. Amweg,
90 Pa. 181; Connery v. Brooke, 73 Pa. 80;
Esling v. Williams, 10 Pa. 126 ; Kemp v.
Penna. R. R., 156 Pa. 430. The plaintiff,
in bringing trespass, in conformity with
the act of 1887, as'a substitute for trespass
on the case, has adopted the proper remedy.
The plaintiff might have shown that he
had been impeded in his enjoyment of his
farm, by his inability to use the lane, and
what damages he suffered in consequence
of this impediment. Had he furnished evidence upon this point it would have been
for the jury to assess damages. He has, at
all events, shown an infringement of hi$
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legal right. There was no error in allowing him to recover nominal damages.
Judgment affirmed.
.KYLE vs. MURPHY.
KERN and GERY for plaintiff.
Plaintiff can recover on the ground of
mistake. McKibben v. Doyle, 173 Pa. 579;
Belknap v. Sealey, 14 N. Y. 147; Tarbell v.
Bowman, 103 Mass. 341.
MISS MARVEL and LENTZ for defendant.
Boundaries and not quantity govern in
description of land. Galbraith v. Galbraith, 6 Watts 117; Glen v. Glen. 4 S. &
R. 488. After a contract for sale of land
has been executed it will not be opened to
allow for a deficiency of quantity. Rogers
v. Olshoffsky, 110 Pa. 147; Dickinson v.
Vorhees, 7 W. & S. 353.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Murphy, living in Cumberland, owned
land in Sullivan county containing 54
acres. The land he had never seen, but
John Harper, who was employed hy hini
to watch the land and prevent intrusion,
and who was a surveyor, and had surveyed
two of the lines of the land, informed Kyle
that the laud contained 150 acres, and that
he had no doubt Murphy would sell it.
Kyle applied to Murphy, agreeing to pay
$20 per acre for the tract; and Harper gave
to Murphy the same statement as to its
area. The deed was made for the land,
described by its adjoiners, and stated to
contain 150 acres more or less, and $3000
were paid at the delivery of the deed. Six
months after the conveyance Kyle, wishing to convey the land, was obliged to
have it surveyed, when he discovered the
actual area to be 54 acres. He then tendered a deed of reconveyance to Murphy.
and brought this as-umpsit to recover the
purchase money.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Rehm, P. J.
The extent of Murphy's ownership was
fifty-four acres. Harper, apparently without request, surveyed two of the lines of
the land and from which, presumably, he
The statement
computed the average.
was given each of the parties to the contract and formed the basis of their transactions. The area given was so grossly in
excess of its true quantity that unless the
tender was in entire ignorance of its extent the facts would indicate carelessness
on his part. The onus of the extent of
ownership to a more or less certain degree
is upon the vendor so far at least as would
import to him reasonable inquiry and an
honest effort to ascertain the same. That
the vendee was under gross misapprehen-

sion must of necessity follow. But, passing this, how does the law construe a deed
"described by its adjoiners, and stated to
contain 150.acres' more or less?' ")
Quantity, as has been stated by the defendant, is ordinarily the least certain, for
it gives neither shape nor form and applied to an irregular plot would vary with
the peculiarities of its lines. But this like
the more certain methods-monuments,
distances, &c.,-is not inflexible and must
bend to the intention of the parties. Lead.
Cas. Real Property, Vol. 4, p. 367. People
ex. reb: Burnhani v. Jones, 112 N. Y. 597.
The earlier reports in this state contain
many adjudications anticipating the frequent attempts that might be made to litigate upon the slightest pretext of variance
in the recitals of boundaries, and have refused to interfere even in cases of apparent
hardship; while yet, these same courts have
been fruitful in dicta to avoid the other extreme of thrusting upon parties contracts
that were never contemplated. It is perhaps unnecessary to query: if a tract of
land contained but ten acres out of a recital
of one hundred, would the law enforce the
former stipulation and entirely exclude the
latter? The cases in Pennsylvania range
from a discrepancy of one-tenth of the area
to that of seven-tenths; in Large v. Penn.
6 S. & R. 488, which is perhaps the maximum variance in this state in which the
court has refused to interfere. In that
case there were three descriptions of the
land: first, by natural boundaries, courses
and distances; secondly, by map of partition and lot number; and thirdly, by
quantity. The foregoing should perhaps
be further qualified by the smallness of the
tract-one acre one hundred and fortyeight perches. In Aschom v. Smith, 2 Pa.
218, it was said: "Our reports furnish no
instance of an abatement (of purchase
money in a deed) even where the difference
was considerable or where the principle
has been sanctioned further than to admit
that there may be extreme cases in which
chancery would infer some great misapprehension and on that ground relax the
law. Boar v. McCormick, 1 S. & R. 168;
Thomas v. Pansy, Peters C. C. R. 49; McDowell v. Cooper, 14 S. & R. 299; Bailey
v. Snyder 13 S. & R. 160, to the same effect. In Belknap v. Sealey, 14 N. Y. 157,
the tract contained four acres and slight
fraction, the deed calling for nine acres approximately, Comstock, J., said: "If there
is any principle in equity on which relief
can be granted against contracts of the
general character of the one under consideration, upon the ground of mistake, and I
think the cases quite uniformly concede
that there is, the circumstances of the
present case are highly favorable to its application."1 In Kent, 4th vol., p.467, note.
t is held that a very great difference (as
thirty-three per cent., for instance) between theactual and estimated quantity
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of acres of land sold in gross would entitle
the party to relief in chancery on the
ground of gross mistake.
The defendant contends that 1ecause of
the money having been passed and the
plaintiff given a deed the transaction could
not not be inquired into. It is eyidently
the policy of the law to hesitate less in the
inception of a negotiation than at its close,
but that this does not preclude the court's
action is very evident from Sharswood's
opinion in Kreiter v. Bomberger, 82 Pa.
59, in which he says, classifying such cases
into three kinds, viz: first when agreement
is executory; secondly, where it is carried
into effect by execution of deed and secur,
ity given, &c.; and thirdly, fully executed
and purchase money paid, "we are of the
opinion that in this class (third) the transaction cannot be ripped up without actual
proof of fraud or mutual ndistake." That
there was gross misapprehension is very
evident and that it was of such a degree as
would be acted upon by the courts may be
safely inferred from the doctrine in New
York and Kentucky and the dicta in
Penna. In the present case there is a variance of nearly 300 per cent., while the
courts of N. Y. and Ken. have given relief
in cases approximating 50 and 33 per cent.
respectively. We believe the decision of
this point makes it unnecessary for further
comment, and therefore enter judgment
for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The tract of land was assumed both by
Kyle and by Murphy to contain 150 acres.
They both agreed that it was worth $20
per acre, and that the former should pay
and the latter receive, $3000. The $3000
has been paid and it having been since
discovered that the tract contains but 54
acres, Kyle seeks to rescind the contract.
by tendering a reconveyance and demanding the return to him of the purchase
money.
If the disparity between the supposed
and actual area had been less, possibly
Kyle would have had no remedy. He
could neither have rescinded no" secured an
abatement from the price. But, Kyle has
paid for three times as many acres as he
has received. He could have recovered
the excess. Hoover v. Senseman, 3 Cent.
540; Cf. Reedy. Horn, 143 Pa. 323.
The effort of Kyle is not to correct the
mistake of the quantity, while the contract, as for the rest, remains in force, but
to repeal the contract in toto, each party
resuming his former position. It is plain
that Kyle was under a mistake. Murphy
either knew the area or was also under a
mistake. If he knew his selling to Kyle
with knowledge that he was buying on
the assumption that he would get, and
that Murphy was representing to him, as
he impliedly was, that he would get 150
acres was a fraud for which recission would

be an appropriate remedy. If Murphy
did not know the actual area of the tract,
but believed it to be 150 acres, he was afflicted with the same mistake as Kyle.
Now it is a general rule that "where certain facts assumed by both parties are the
basis of a contract, and it subsequently appears such facts do not exist, the contract
is inoperative." Rieg'el v. Insurance Co.,
140 Pa. 193; Fink v. gmith, 170 Pa. 124. A
sale of land on an expectation common to
both parties, that certain public works are
to be built, which will affect its value, will
on the disappointment of this expectation,
justify a retreat from the sale. Miles v.
Stevens, 3 Pa. 21.
The area of the Murphy tract was probably ;in two ways important. It determined the purchase money, and the payment of more than $1080 was wholly due
to the error concerning it. It is likely too
that the tract would not have been bought
at all if its real size had been known. One
who desires a farm of 150 acres may not be
willing to buy one of but 54 acres. If B
buys three lots and houses, he cannot be
compelled to accept a deed for one of them
only. Martin v Fridenberg, 169 Pa. 447;
Cf. Graver v. Scott, 80 Pa. 88; Stoddart v.
Smith, 5 Biun. 3.55. When the difference
betwveen the actual size of the farm and
the size assumed by the vendee is so great
asfin the case before us, it would be unjust
to compel the purchaser to retain and pay
for the actual farm, and dtill more, to give
him no redress at all. In Babcock v. Day,
104 Pa. 4, A bought a farm under the
representation that within its metes and
bounds. there-stood two frame barns. The
deed properly described the boundaries,
but the barns wereon an adjacent tract. It
was held that the purchaser's appropriate
remedy was a reconveyance with a recdvery back of the purchase money.
Johnson's Appeal, 114 Pa. 132 exhibits
facts similar to those before us. The land
containing 52 acres, was sold as containing
150 aQres, at the price of $10 per acre, by a
guardian, under the direction of the Orphans' Court. Two years after the conveyance, and payment of the price, the
vendee, on making a survey, discovered
the error. He then appealed to the Orphans' Court to rectify the mistake by allowing him to tender a deed for the land
to the guardian, and by requiring the latter to pay back to him the purchase money. Says Paxson, J., after affirming the
power of the court to review its own acts.
"We also think it was not only justified
upon the merits, but-thatit wasrequired by
theprinciplesof common honesty. It would
be a reproach to the law were it to fail to
correct such a mistake as is disclosed by
this record.'
Some of the decisions cited by the able
counsel for the defendant turn on the position that the assumed number of acres
was not the means of fixing the price, but
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that a sum had been adopte& not conditioned upon such number. Others descry
in the facts an indication that the parties
intended to take the risk of the accuracy
of the estimate; others that the vendee
was to cause a survey before accepting the
conveyance and paying the money; and
that the doing of the latter without a survey was a waiver of the original condition,
and an election to be absolutely bound by
the area.assumed andpaid for. They cannot all be harmonized, either with each
other or with the result that we have
reached. It is wholly clear that Kyle did
not intend: to pay for more acres than he
got, nor to pay at all, unless he got approximately 150 acres, and that Murphy knew
his purpose They were both in error.
It would not be right to compel Murphy
to lose his farm for less than the money he
expected to get for it; nor, on the other
hand, to compel Kyle to keep a farm so
much less than what he desired, especially
at the price of a farm three times as large.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHN BECKER vs. JOB QUINN.
CONLEY and FRANK for defendant.
MITCHELL and BucK for plaintiff.

The Ames Mfg. Co., a limited partnership, making enginesand other machinery,
was also in the habit of receiving deposits
of persons in the neighborhood, and giving certificates therefor, payable on demand with three per cent. interest, for any
time not less than three months. On Apr.
7, 1897, Becker deposited with it $450 and
received a certificate reading thus:
NEwvILLE, APR. 1, 1897.
The Ames Mfg. Co., will payon demand
to John Becker, $450 with interest at three
per cent., for so long as payment of this
certificate is not demanded, provided it
shall not be demanded in three months.
THE AmEs MFG. Co.
In the afternoon of April 7, 1897, the
Company, being insolvent, made an assignment for the benefit of creditors to
Job Quinn. Quinn took immediate possession of the property and inter alia, of
the package of $450, which was yet unopened. The property was sold, the $450
being used up in meeting the expenses
connected with the trust. Demand being
made on Quinn for the $450 and he refusing this assumpsit is brought.
The assets will not pay more than 33
per cent. of the debts.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Stuart, P. J.
It is conceded by counsel and supported
by authority, that the business done by the
Ames Manufacturing Company was that
of Banking. InCurtisv. Leavitt, 15 N. Y.
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9, Comstock, J., speaking on the subject
said: "If a person should open and keep
an office for receiving deposits, payable on
demand, lie would carry on a well known
He
branch of the banking business. * *
would be a banker." This statement fits
the facts in this case. It being established
that the Ames Manufacturing Company
was doing a banking business-that their
status was that of a bank-the moment
they received possession of this money and
gave in lieu thereof the certificate of deposit
the money became their money. This is
the doctrine in Foley against Hill, 2 Clarke
and Finnelly, House of Lords Cases 28, per
Lord Ch. Cottonham, "Money when paid
into a bank ceases altogether to be the
money of the principal, it is then the money
of the banker." Also 10 Wallace, National
Bank of the Republic v. Millard, "It is no
longer an open question in this Court since
the decision in the cases of the Marine
Bank v. The Fulton Bank, and of Thompson v. Riggs, that the relation of Banker
and customer in their pecuniary dealings
is that of debtor and creditor." We have
the doctrine in even terser shape in our
own State. In 42 Pa. 536, Bank of the
Northern Liberities v. Jones, it is said:
"Money when paid into a bank ceases 'altogether to be the money of the principal.
It is then the money of the banker, who
is bound to return an equivalent by paying
a similar sum to that deposited with him,
when he is asked for it." Consequently
the $450, although in an unopened package,
was the property of the Ames Manufacturing Company, and the assignee was justified in using the same for the legitimate
expenses of the trust. Mr. Becker is entitled to share with the other creditors on
a basis of thirty-three per cent.
This sum.of money was not a special deposit, as defined by the authorities. On
that ground Mr. Becker cannot recover.
Nor was the money deposited as a bailment.
"It is deemed a fraud upon a depositor
for the bank to accept deposits upon the
eve of suspension or to enter into new obligations, and title to the deposits so received will remain in the depositor. It is
then the duty of the banker to decline further deposits, or at least it is his duty
when he is convinced that he is insolvent
beyond remedy or hope of recuperation,"
A. & E. E. of Law 847. However, as the
point was not urged by counsel nor does it
appear from the statement of facts, that
fraud was practiced, nor that the Ames
Manufacturing Company had any reason
to be convinced that their insolvency was
inevitable, we will not consider Mr.
Becker's standing in this respect.
As to the statutory provision that a limited partnership shall not do a banking
business the only penalty seems to be that
the members of the firm are held liable as
general partners. Haddock v. Grinnell,
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109 Pa. 372. This firm did a banking business in violation of the provisions of the
Act of Assembly. They are, therefore,
liable individually as general partners.
While Mr. Becker in the distribution before us is entitled to 33 per cent., he still
has his remedy against the individual estates of tire partners at present or should
they acquire property in the future, before
the Statute of Limitation bars the right.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

Becker deposited with the Aines-Manufacturing Co. $450, taking from the latter
a certificate which entitled him to repayment on demand. It is needless to determine whether the company was engaged in the business of banking, for the
rights of the parties in no way depend on
the decision. The transaction was a loan
of $450. When it occurred thecompany
was insolvent and it knew it was insolyent.
Was the loan on this account revocable?
When a bank discounts a note and
shortly afterwards discovers that the custoner was insolvent, it may cancel the
credit extended to him on its books as a
depositor by charging at once to him the
amount of the note and crediting him
with the discount. It may do this, although just before the customer has made
an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
Lancaster County National Bank v.
Ruver, 114 Pa. 216; Warner v. Hare, 154
Pa. 548; or on the same day has drawn
checks upon the deposit in due course of
business in favor of others. Dougherty
Bro. v. Cent. National Bank, 93 Pa. 227.
In these cases the loan of the money by
the bank is assimilated to a sale of a
chattel and the continuance of the credit
on its books of the sum loaned, before it
has been withdrawn by check, is likened
to the transitusof a chattel on the vehicle
of a carrier from the vendor to the vendee.
As the vendor can arrest the chattel in
transitu,on learning of the insolvency of
the vendee, so the bank. the lendor, can
recall the loan, while it is still in the form
of an unexhausted credit on its books.
This right like that of step page in transitu
is not in 93 Pa. 227, and 114 Pa. 216, predicated on any fraud, on the part of the borrower, in borrowing where insolvent.
A purchase of a chattel or credit, by one
who at the time is insolvent and knows
that he is insolvent, is not, for that reason,
voidable by the vendor, in. Pennsylvania.
Smith v. Smith, 21 Pa. 367; Backentoss v.
Speicher, 31 Pa. 324 ; Cincinnati Cooperage
Co. v. Gaul, 170 Pa. 545. That the law is
in this condition is to be regretted. Bughman v. Central Bank, 159 Pa. 94; A plegate v. Worthington, 1 Forum 7, and 159
Pa. 94, indicates atendingto hold that the
confession of ajudgment which will sweep
away all the purchaser's assets, or a bill of
sale covering all his propery, shortly after
the purchase, will make it voidable for
fraud by the vendor. We are probably

not far from a period when the courts of
Pennsylvaniia will hold, as do those of
England, of the United States, and of
many states, that to buy goods, when one
is insolvent, and without the expectation
of paying for them, is frauddlent, and that
the vendor may rescind the sale. Clark,
Contracts, 328, note. Cf. Corn Exchange
Bank v. Loan, etc., Co., 188 Pa. 330.
A loan of money is a sale of it on credit.
There is no good reason for making a distinction between the effect on the loan, of
the concealment of the insolvency of the
borrower, and the effect on a sale of a chattel, of the purchaser's insolvency. If one
who buys a horse on credit commits no
fraud on the vendor although he is insolvent, and conceals his insolvency, it is impossible to see how the borrower of money
commits a fraud on the lender, in concealing from the latter his insolvency. The
restiveness under the rule of Smith v.
Smith, 21 Pa. 367, supra,shown by Mitchell, J., in 159 Pa. 94, seems to have induced the supreme court in Corn Exchange
National Bank v. Loan etc., Co., 188 Pa.
330, to depart from it in the case of a loan.
It is there held that the acceptance of a
deposit by an insolvent bank, i. e., the
borrowing of money by an insolvent person, or corporation, is a fraud on the depositor, and the loan can be rescinded, and
the money deposited, if still distinguishable, may be recovered back in specie.
Authority from courts not infested with
the Pennsylvania theory that a purchase
by an insolvent who conceals his insolvency are cited. In that case the facts
were similar to those of the case before us,
except that the-deposit there was still unmingled with the other funds of the bank.
and the proceeding was a bill in equity to
compel the bank's assignee to redeliver it
specifically to the depositor, while, in the
case before us, the deposit has been used
by the assignee, and the aQtion against
him is assumpsit. If the deposit were still
in the hands of the assignee, it could be recovered in replevin or by.bill in equity.
The assignee, while the deposit was still
in a distinct package, was required to deliver it to the depositor. He refused, An
action could have been brought against
him for it, 188 Pa. 330, supra; Knowles v.
Lord, 4. Uh. 500; Trickett, Assignments,
128 et seq. He has since converted the deposit, by using it in the trust. He is personally responsible for this conversion, and
the action of assumpsit is an appropriate
remedy. Becker is not claiming as a creditor of the Ames Company, a dividend out
of the assigned estate. ie is urging that
the $450 were his own, and not the company's; that its assignmentpassed to Quinn
no right to detain and consume the money,
and that Quinn, by detaining and consuming it, after notice to deliver it to Becker,
is personally liable for the conversion.
Judgment reversed.

